NOTES 


ON  THE 


PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  P.  H.  SHERIDAN 


BY 

CARSWELL   McCLELLAN, 

BREVET   LIEUTENANT-COLONEL   U.  S.  VOLS. 


ST.  PAUL 

.  g.  fanning 


PHILIP    HENRY    SHERIDAN. 


PROMINENT  amcno-  the  heroes  of  our  late  Civil  War,  was  the  Gen 

o 

eral  familiarly  known  as  Phil.  Sheridan.  This  brave  officer  was  born 
in  Somerset,  Perry  County,  Ohio,  on  the  6th  of  March,  1831.  He 
was  graduated  at  the  United  States  Military  Academy  at  West  Point 
in  1853,  and  in  July  of  that  year,  was  assigned  to  the  1st  Infantry  as 
brevet  second  lieutenant.  He  was  ordered  to  Texas  where  he  served 
until  1855,  when  he  joined  the  4th  Infantry,  and  going  to  the  Pacific 
Coast  he  served  in  Washington  and  Oregon  Territories  until  the  fall 
of  1861.  From  December  of  that  year,  to  March  of  the  following  one, 
he  was  assigned  as  chief  quartermaster  and  commissary  of  the  Army  of 
the  Southwest.  He  afterwards  served,  in  like  capacity,  on  the  Staff  of 
General  Halleck,  in  the  Corinth  campaign.  In  May  he  was  appointed 
colonel  of  the  Second  Michigan  Cavalry,  and  took  part  in  the  success 
ful  expedition  to  destroy  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad  at  Booneville, 
Mississippi.  In  June  he  defeated  Forrest's  cavalry.  Taking  command 
of  the  2d  brigade  of  cavalry,  he  repulsed  and  defeated  a  superior 
Confederate  force  under  Chalmers,  at  Booneville,  in  July.  For  his 
gallantry  in  this  fierce  engagement  he  was  commissioned  brigadier- 
general  of  volunteers. 

In  September  he  was  transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and 
commanded  General  Gilbert's  left  division  at  the  battle  of  Perry ville. 

In  the  advance  to  Murfreesborough,  in  December,  he  led  a  divi 
sion  under  General  McCook,  and  much  of  the  successful  issue  of  the 
battle  of  Stone  River  was  due  to  him.  In  this  battle  he  rose  to  the 
rank  of  major-general  of  volunteers.  The  signal  service  rendered  at 
the  battles  of  Missionary  Ridge  and  Chickamauga,  by  Sheridan,  added 
still  further  to  his  renown.  When  Grant  was  promoted  to  be  lieutenant- 
general  he  applied  for  the  transfer  of  Sheridan  to  the  East,  and  ap 
pointed  him  chief  of  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  where  he 
routed  the  Confederate  cavalry  in  several  engagements. 


PHILIP     HE  KEY     SHEKIDAW. 

In  the  battle  of  Winchester,  Sheridan  defeated  Early.  The  fruits 
of  this  victory  were  five  cannons,  six  or  seven  thousand  small-arms, 
and  five  thousand  prisoners.  The  loss  of  the  Confederates  was  not 
less  than  seven  thousand.  He  pursued  General  Early,  who  retreated 
to  Fisher's  Hill.  Here  a  battle  ensued  on  the  21st  of  September.  It 
was  waged  with  varying  success  until  evening.  The  Confederates 
were  then  driven  from  their  intrenchments  in  great  confusion.  Eleven 
hundred  prisoners  were  taken,  sixteen  pieces  of  artillery,  besides 
wagons,  horses,  &c.  In  a  week  Sheridan  had  destroyed  half  of  Early's 
army,  and  sent  the  rest  "  whirling  up  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah.'7 
To  prevent  any  further  raids  upon  Washington  from  this  direction,  ho 
devastated  the  region  so  thoroughly  that  it  was  said,  "  If  a  crow  wants 
to  fly  down  the  Shenandoah,  he  must  carry  his  provisions  with  him." 

Early  was  quickly  reinforced,  and  under  cover  of  a  dense  fog  sur 
prised  the  Union  army  at  Cedar  Creek,  on  the  19th  of  October,  and 
drove  it  in  confusion.  Sheridan  heard  the  cannonading  at  Winchester, 
thirteen  miles  away.  Putting  spurs  to  his  steed,  he  never  stopped  till, 
his  horse  covered  with  foam,  he  dashed  upon  the  battle-field  shouting, 
"  Turn,  boys,  turn ;  we're  going  back."  His  presence  rallied  the  men, 
and,  attacking  the  Confederates,  who  were  busy  plundering  the  captur 
ed  camp,  they  routed  them  with  great  slaughter. 

Though  Sheridan  had  lost  seventeen  thousand  men,  he  had  virtually 
destroyed  Early's  army.  This  campaign,  of  only  a  month's  duration 7 
was  one  of  the  most  brilliant  of  the  Rebellion.  The  thanks  of  Con 
gress  were  bestowed  upon  the  army  and  its  gallant  leader,  and  on  the 
8th  of  November  he  was  appointed  major-general  of  the  regular  army, 
He  commanded  at  the  battle  of  Five  Forks,  where  he  gained  a  decisive 
victory,  and  captured  upward  of  six  thousand  prisoners  at  Sailors' 
Creek,  in  April,  1865.  Finally,  in  co-operation  with  General  Grant, 
he  compelled  the  surrender  of  General  Lee,  the  trusted  leader  of  the 
Confederate  army.  Near  Appomattox  Court  House,  on  the  9th  of 
April,  the  remains  of  the  army  of  Virginia  laid  down  their  arms  and 
turned  homeward.  This  affair  ended  the  war. 

During  the  next  two  years  General  Sheridan  performed  most 
valuable  service  in  Texas  and  Louisiana.  He  enforced  the  Eeconstruc- 
tion  Acts,  for  which  he  was  removed  by  President  Johnson  in  August, 
1867.  In  September  he  was  transferred  to  the  Department  of  the 
Missouri.  In  March,  1869,  he  was  promoted  to  be  lieutenant-general, 
and  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Division  of  the  Missouri. 


ZX  -TCI.;!?  II-  SHERIDAN,U.  S.A. 


NOTES 


OX   THE 


PERSONAL  MEMOIRS  OF  P.  H.  SHERIDAN 


CARSWELL    McCLELLAN, 


BREVET    LIEUTENANT-COLONEL    I".   S.   VOL! 


ST.     P.U.'L 

(press  of  HEm.  fi.  qtSanm'ng 

i£8g 


J'Y.^A^^.vyf'I-L  McgLBBUAN. 


"To  vindicate  a  citizen  unjustly  assailed,  is 
the  duty  of  all  men  who  properly  estimate 
the  value  of  individual  character  and  its  in 
fluence  on  the  public  good." 

—  REVERDY  JOHNSON. 


NOTES. 


THE  WILDERNESS 

AND 

SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE. 


On  April  6,  1864,  in  compliance  with  orders  from 
the  War  Department,  Major-General  Philip  H.  Sheri 
dan  assumed  command  of  the  Cavalry  Corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  That  corps  needs  no  eulogy 
here.  Around  the  standards  of  its  regiments  clung 
memories  of  Virginia  lowland  fields  and  fords,  of 
London's  glades,  and  Blue  Ridge  passes,  of  Mary 
land's  hills  and  vales,  and  Gettysburg's  fields  and 
roads,  that  time  cannot  blur  or  language  brighten. 
From  its  records,  clustering  around  that  of  the 
heroic  Buford,  flashed  many  a  name  that  told  of 
knightly  deed  and  daring.  There  was  no  small 
honor  held,  no  slight  obligation  taken,  writh  the 
chieftainship  of  that  veteran  command. 

On  examination,  it  is  obvious  that  the  official  re 
ports  of  General  Sheridan,  as  published  in  Volume  n, 
Supplemental  Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  WTar,  38th  Congress,  2d  Session,  con 
stitute,  as  far  as  General  Sheridan  is  concerned,  "the 
record"  so  confidently  referred  to  by  General  Grant 


in  the  preface  to  his  Personal  Memoirs.  Interest  in 
these  reports,  and  in  General  Badeau's  Military  His 
tory  of  U.  S.  Grant  and  General  Grant's  Memoirs,  is 
revived  by  the  publication  of  the  "Personal  Memoirs 
of  P.  H.  Sheridan."  In  what  relates  to  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  these  last  memoirs  add  but  little  to  the 
volume  of  statements  contained  in  the  preceding 
companion  and  complementary  works,  but  they  in 
vite  attention  by  furnishing  explanation  of  much 
that  hitherto  has  seemed  to  many  anomalous  and 
perplexing. 

For  a  quarter  of  a  century  past,  all  criticism,  or 
argument,  or  narration,  tending  to  support,  or  de 
fend,  the  reputations  of  the  veterans  of  the  Virginia 
battle  fields,  as  against  statements,  or  implications, 
or  claims,  made  by,  or  on  behalf  of,  Generals  Grant 
and  Sheridan,  has  been  met  by  clamorous  charges 
of  jealousy.  General  Sheridan's  Memoirs  are  an  in 
teresting  commentary  upon  this  line  of  argument. 

Commencing  on  page  353  of  his  first  volume,  he 
re-states  from  his  report  of  Ma\^  13,  1866,  in  brief, 
that  his  new  command  presented  a  fine  appearance ; 
that  the  showing,  so  far  as  the  health  and  equipment 
of  the  men  were  concerned,  was  good  and  satisfac 
tory,  but  that  the  horses  were  thin  and  worn  down 
by  excessive  and,  it  seemed  to  him,  unnecessary 
picket  duty ;  that  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war 
the  enemy  had  shown  more  wisdom  respecting  his 
cavalry,  and  that  at  that  very  time  he  (the  enemy ) 
was  husbanding  the  strength  of  his  horses  by  keep 
ing  them  to  the  rear  so  that  they  might  be  in  good 
condition  for  the  impending  campaign.  He  says 
that,  before  and  after  a  review  of  his  troops  a  few 
days  after  he  had  assumed  command,  he  took  in  the 
situation  and  determined  to  remedy  it  if  possible ; 


that,  while  he  knew  it  wrould  be  difficult  to  overcome 
the  custom  of  so  subordinating  the  operations  of  the 
cavalry  to  the  movements  of  the  main  army  that  in 
name  only  was  it  a  corps  at  all,  still  he  thought  it .his 
duty  to  try.  He  states  that,  in  fulfilment  of  that 
duty,  he  sought  an  interview  with  General  Meade 
and  informed  him  that,  in  his  opinion,  as  the  effect 
iveness  of  his  command  lay  mainly  in  the  strength  of 
his  horses,  the  duty  the  cavalry  were  then  performing 
was  both  burdensome  and  wasteful;  that  cavalry 
should  be  kept  concentrated  to  fight  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  ;  that  moving  columns  of  infantry  should  take 
care  of  their  own  fronts ;  that,  if  he  (General  Meade) 
would  let  him  (General  Sheridan)  use  the  cavalry  as 
he  contemplated,  there  need  be  little  fear  as  to  at 
tacks  upon  the  trains  or  flanks  and  rear  of  the 
army,  as  it  was  his  object  to  defeat  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  in  a  general  combat,  if  possible,  and  by  such  a 
result  to  establish  a  feeling  of  confidence  in  his  own 
.troops  that  would  enable  him,  after  a  while,*  to 
march  w^here  he  pleased  destroying  the  communica 
tions  and  resources  of  the  enemy.  He  doesrzot  state, 
however,  what  substitute  he  suggested  to  General 
Meade  to  be  used  in  place  of  the  cavalry  arm  of  the 
Army  of  the*  Potomac  until  such  time  as  the  desired 
confidence  had  been  acquired  by  his  corps,  and  the 
enemy's  resources  were  destroyed,  or  in  the  event  of 
the  failure  of  his  efforts  to  engage  and  defeat  the 
enemy's  cavalry  in  a  general  combat.  He  states 
that,  though  at  different  times  during  General 
Meade's  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the 
cavalry  had  been  massed  in  considerable  bodies  for 
special  purposes,  and  that,  though  the  interview  re 
sulted  in  his  command  being  relieved  from  much  har 
assing  picket  service,  still  he  received  but  little  en- 

*  Note.     All  italics  are  the  present  writers,   unless  noted. 


couragement  from  General  Meade  whose  convictions 
were  opposed  to  the  proffered  suggestions.  Those 
convictions  General  Sheridan  states  were,  in  brief, 
that  the  cavalry  commander  should  be  so  located 
that  the  commander  of  the  army  could  give  to  that 
arm  such  "detailed  directions  as,  in  his  judgment, 
occasion  required;"  that  cavalry  was  fit  for  little 
more  than  guard  and  picket  duty,  the  protection  of 
trains,  and  the  covering  of  the  fronts  and  securing 
the  flanks  of  moving  infantry  columns — that  they 
were,  in  fact,  so  widely  divergent  from  his  (General 
Sheridan's)  opinions  that  disagreements  arose  dur 
ing  the  battles  of  the  Wilderness.  He  says  further: 
"Conscious  that  he  [General  Meade]  would  BE  COM 
PELLED  sooner  or  later  either  to  change  his  mind  or 
partially  GIVE  WAY  TO  THE  FRESvSURE  OF  EVENTvS,  / 
entered  on  the  campaign  with  the  loyal  determina 
tion  to  aid  zealously  in  all  its  plans",  and  he  states 
that,  after  the  battles  of  the  Wilderness,  "the  cav 
alry  corps  became  more  of  a  compact  body,  with  the 
same  privileges  and  responsibilities  that  attached  to 
the  other  corps  —  conditions  that  never  actually 
existed  before." 

It  is  needless  to  comment  upon  how  unkindly  the 
concluding  words  just  quoted  reflect  upon  General 
Hooker's  cherished  reputation  as  the  organizer  of 
the  cavalry  corps.  It  cannot  be  necessary  to  recap 
itulate  the  record  of  that  corps  under  orders  received 
from  General  Meade,  in  order  to  amend  General 
Sheridan's  assertion  of  the  views  held  by  his  su 
perior  ;  and  it  would  be  wearisome  to  cite  authorities 
as  to  the  functions  of  the  cavalry  arm.  It  would 
seem  to  be  superfluous  to  enlarge  upon  the  manifest 
fact  that,  while  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  lay 
securelv  guarded  bv  the  encircling  homes  of  friends 


every  one  of  whom  was  constantly  on  picket,  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  immediately  confronting  the 
Confederate  army,  was  camped  on  hostile  ground 
and  surrounded  by  directly  opposite  conditions.  It 
is  hardly  worth  while  to  refer  to  Shiloh,  or  Mur- 
phreesboro,  or  Mauassas  Junction.  The  point 
worthy  of  notice  is,  that,  w^hile  General  Sheridan 
confesses  (Vol.  I.  p.  342)  he  was  but  slightly  ac 
quainted  with  military  operations  in  Virginia  \vhen, 
on  March  23,  he  was  ordered  to  report  for  duty  in 
that  state,  nevertheless,  immediately  after  he  had  as 
sumed  his  new  authority,  he  felt  fully  competent  to 
depreciate  the  command  to  which  he  had  been  ele 
vated  and  to  spurn  the  record  of  the  men  who,  within 
the  setting  of  many  another  clash  of  steel,  and  car 
bine  volley,  and  thunder  of  horse  artillery,  had  —  led 
by  Generals  Buford  and  Gregg,  under  the  command 
of  General  Pleasant  on  —  through  the  long  hours  of 
June  9,  1863,  crossed  sabres  with  the  Cavalry  Corps 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  urged  on  by  its 
dashing  chief  and  his  able  subordinates  Generals 
Hampton  and  the  Lees;  —  who,  under  General  Bu 
ford,  had  met  and  held  the  advancing  Confederate 
infantry  on  that  July  1,  made  ever  memorable  in  his 
tory  by  their  staunchness;  —  and  who,  under  Gen 
erals  Gregg  and  Custer,  on  the  third  day  of  that 
sarme  July,  received  their  old  acquaintances  of  the 
Southern  "long  sword,  saddle  and  bridle,"  upon 
their  advent  on  the  decisive  battle  field  of  the  war, 
with  a  welcome  that  never  after  left  their  memories. 
Nor  did  he  hesitate  to  instruct  in  elementary  military 
science,  and  enlighten  as  to  his  duty  and  privileges  in 
connection  with  the  cavalry  of  his  command,  his  su 
perior  officer  —  a  veteran  distinguished  in  both  mili 
tary  and  civil  life  before  General  Sheridan  had  been 


6 

graduated  —  who  had  participated  in  all  the  cam 
paigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and,  on  un 
sought  assignment  by  the  President,  had  for  ten 
months  been  its  commander.  He  says:  "My  prop 
osition  seemed  to  stagger  General  Meade  not  a 
little," — and  it  well  may  be  believed,  for,  if  words 
have  any  meaning,  that  proposition  was,  in  effect, 
that  General  Meade  should  unconditionally  sur 
render  the  control  of  his  cavalry  corps,  and  the  safe 
guard  of  the  army  for  whose  efficiency  he  was  res 
ponsible,  into  the  hands  of  a  comparatively  unknown 
officer  w^ho  appeared  to  believe  that  the  operations 
of  the  main  army  should  be  subordinated  to  the  un 
restricted  discretion  of  the  commander  of  the  cavalry 
arm.  General  Sheridan's  Memoirs  clear  away  any 
doubts  that  may  have  been  left  upon  the  subject  by 
the  accounts  of  either  General  Badeau  or  General 
Grant. 

It  is  believed  that  even  a  careless  reader  must 
note  one  result  of  the  want  of  harmony  between  Gen 
eral  Meade 's  convictions  and  General  Sheridan's  as 
pirations  in  that  the  accounts  of  the  cavalry  opera 
tions  during  the  Wilderness  battles  and  themovement 
to  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  as  given  by  General 
Sheridan  in  his  report  of  May  13,  1866,  and  as  re 
peated  by  Generals  Badeau  and  Grant,  and  as  now 
again  repeated,  writh  some  variations,  by  General 
Sheridan  (Vol.  i.  p.  359  et  seq.),  are  thinly  veiled  ar 
raignments  of  the  intelligence  of  General  Meade  and, 
to  use  a  mild  expression,  unsoldierly  disparagement 
of  the  authority  of  the  commander  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac. 

After  reciting  the  order  in  which  the  divisions  of 
his  corps  crossed  the  Rapidan  on  May  4,  1864,  and 
the  positions  and  duties  assigned  to  each,  together 


.with  the  location  of  his  own  headquarters  at  Chan- 
cellorsville,  General  Sheridan  states  that  his  orders 
to  General  J.  H.  Wilson,  who  with  his  division  had 
preceded  the  Fifth  Corps  in  the  movement,  had  lo 
cated  that  officer  at  Parker's  Store,  but  that,  on  the 
morning  of  May  5,  by  direct  order  of  General 
Meade,  General  Wilson  was  moved  toward  Craig's 
Meeting  House ;  that  the  movement  resulted  in  seri 
ous  embarrassment  to  General  Wilson ;  and  that  an 
order  from  General  Meade  directing  him  (General 
Sheridan)  to  go  to  General  Wilson's  relief  was  the 
first  intimation  he  received  that  General  Wilson  had 
been  pushed  out  so  far.  His  report  of  May  13,  1866, 
does  not  contain  this  concluding  statement,  how 
ever,  and  Generals  Badeau  and  Grant  evidently 
missed  the  point  that  General  Sheridan  intended  to 
make.  On  page  192  of  his  second  volume,  General 
Grant  says :  — 

My  orders  were  given  through  General  Meade  for  an  early 
advance  on  the  morning  of  the  5th.  Warren  was  to  move  to 
Parker's  Store,  and  Wilson's  cavalry  —  then  at  Parker's  Store — to 
move  to  Craig's  Meeting  House. 

The  circular  order  for  the  movement,  as  issued 
by  command  of  General  Meade,  commences:- 

Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

May  4,  1864,  6  p.  m. 

Orders. 

The  following  movements  are  ordered  for  the  5th  of  May, 
1864: 

1.  Major-General  Sheridan,  commanding  Cavalry  Corps, 
will  move  with  Gregg's  and  Torbert's  divisions  against  the  en- 
enry's  cavalry  in  the  direction  of  Hamilton's  Crossing.  General 
Wilson,  with  the  Third  Cavalry  Division,  will  move  at  5  a.  m.,  to 
Craig's  Meeting  House,  on  the  Catharpin  Road 

General  Humphreys  states  (The  Virginia  Cam 
paign  of  1864  and  1865)  that  the  order  for  General 
Sheridan's  movement  was  issued  at  General  Sheri- 


8 

dan's  suggestion,  he  having  reported  during  the  4th 
that  he  had  received  information  that  the  main  body 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  in  the  direction  indicated. 
It  is  presumable  that  General  Sheridan  read  the  or 
der  as  quoted,  and  was  therefore  aware  of  the  move 
ment  intended  to  be  made  by  General  Wilson.  In 
his  report  of  May  13,  1866,  he  says :— 

It  was  now  well  understood  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  at 
Hamilton's  Crossing  had  joined  General  Lee's  forces,  and  the  ne 
cessity  for  my  moving  to  that  point,  as  ordered,  was  obviated. 

On  page  362  of  the  first  volume  of  his  Memoirs, 
however,  he  expresses  it :  — 

Information  .  .  .  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  about 
Hamilton's  Crossing  was  all  being  drawn  in,  reached  me  on  the 
5th,  which  obviated  all  necessity  for  my  moving  on  that  point  as 
I  intended  at  the  onset  of  the  campaign. 

On  pages  103  and  104  of  the  second  volume  of 
his  History,  General  Badeau  says:  "  .  .  the  Brock 
Road  is  the  key  to  all  this  region ;  Cutting 

all  these  transverse  roads  at  right  angles,  it  enabled 
whichever  army  held  it  to  outflank  the  other,  and 
was,  of  course,  of  immense  importance  to  both  com 
manders."  This  is  now  well  understood  by  all  read 
ers  of  wTar  history,  as  is  also  the  fact  that,  in  the 
Wilderness  battles,  General  Hancock's  command, 
holding  the  intersection  of  the  Brock  Road  with  the 
Orange  Plank  Road,  extending  to  within  about  two 
miles  of  Todd's  Tavern  and  resting  in  the  impene 
trable  forest  that  stretched  on  both  sides  of  the 
Brock  Road  to  that  point,  constituted  the  left  flank 
of  the  Federal  army. 

General  Sheridan  states  that  he  was  held  respon 
sible  for  the  safety  of  the  left  flank  of  the  army  and 
the  trains,  and  that  he  secured  these  objects,  after 
Ouster's  and  Devin's  brigades  had  been  severely  en 
gaged  at  the  Furnaces,  by  holding  the  line  of  the 


9 

Brock  Road  beyond  the  Furnaces,  and  thence  around 
to  Todd's  Tavern  and  Piney  Branch  Church,  and  felt 
that  the  line  taken  up  could  be  held,  but  that  Gen 
eral  Meade,  on  false  report,  became  alarmed  about 
his  left,  and  sent  him  a  note,  signed  by  General  Hum 
phreys  and  dated  at  one  o'clock  p.  M.  May  6,  which 
stated  :  "General  Hancock  has  been  heavily  pressed, 
and  his  left  turned.  The  Major-general  commanding 
thinks  that  you  had  better  draw  in  your  cavalry  so 
as  to  {secure  the  protection  of  the  trains,"  —  and  that, 
in  obedience  to  this  order,  he  drew  all  the  cavalry 
close  in  toward  Chancellorsville,  and  thereby  was 
subjected  to  heavy  loss  in  regaining  the  points 
abandoned,  when  the  orders  for  the  movements  of 
May  7,  were  received.  Generals  Grant  and  Badeau 
omit  all  reference  to  this  matter,  and  General  Hum 
phreys  savs :  "The  drawing  in  of  the  cavalry  the 
day  before  did  not  oblige  them  to  figh£  on  disadvan 
tageous  ground  on  the  7th,  nor  under  any  other  ad 
verse  conditions."  But  suppose  the  results  to  have 
been  as  General  Sheridan  alleges,  to  whom  should 
censure  belong?  He  states  that  he  felt  able  to  hold 
the  line  he  had  occupied  for  the  express  purpose  of 
securing  the  protection  of  the  trains,  "which  was  all 
the  one  o'clock  dispatch  required.  He  also  states 
that  he  was  responsible  for  the  safety  of  the  leftnank 
of  the  army,  and  General  Grant  corroborates  the 
statement  when  he  says  (Vol.  2.  p.  197):  "On  the 
morning  of  the  6th  Sheridan  was  sent  to  connect 
with  Hancock's  left  and  attack  the  enemy's  cavalry 
who  were  trying  to  get  on  our  left  flank  and  rear." 
General  Sheridan  does  not  state,  however,  how  it 
happened  that  he,  with  this  responsibility  resting 
upon  him,  was  ignorant  of  the  erroneousness  of  the 
report  upon  which  General  Meade,  in  the  dense  and 


11 

deadly  forest-tangle  to  which  he  was  condemned  by 
General  Grant,  had  based  his  dispatch ;  and  he  offers 
no  explanation  of  the  fact  that  no  apparent  effort 
was  made  to  determine  the  exact  condition  of  affairs 
before  surrendering  a  tenable  line  holding  the  needed 
Brock  Road,  and  before  abandoning  Todd's  Tavern 
-  the  key  to  the  Federal  left. 

General  Sheridan  states  (Mem.  Vol.  1,  and  Re 
port  of  May  13,  1866),  that,  to  remedy  what  he  was 
satisfied  was  a  misunderstanding  upon  which  the  or 
der  for  the  movement  of  the  trains,  on  May  7,  had 
been  issued:  "Gregg  attacked  with  one  of  his  bri 
gades  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  and  drove  the  enemy 
over  Corbin's  Bridge;  Merritt  .  .  .  attacked 
with  his  division,  on  the  Spottsylvania  Road,  driv 
ing  him  toward  Spottsylvania,  and  Davies's  brigade 
of  Gregg's  division  made  a  handsome  attack  on  the 
Piney  Branch  Church  Road,  uniting  with  Merritt  on 
the  Spottsylvania  Road.";  that  the  enemy  were  pur 
sued  "almost  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House;  but 
deeming  it  prudent  to  recall  the  pursuers  at  dark,  he 
[I]  encamped  Gregg's  and  Merritt 's  divisions  in  the 
open  fields  to  the  east  of  Todd's  Tavern."  It  is  ab 
out  two  miles  from  Todd's  Tavern  to  the  junction  of 
the  Piney  Branch  Church  Road  and  the  Brock 
( Spottsylvania )  Road,  and  something  over  three 
miles  from  that  junction  to  Spottsylvania  Court 
House,  and  the  movement  described  by  General  Sheri 
dan  had,  before  his  withdr a wal,  secured  to  him  the 
most  difficult  and  thickly  wooded  portion  of  the 
line. 

The  following  is  a  copy  of  General  Meade's  order 


12 


for  movement   under  which   General  Sheridan   was 
supposed  to  be  acting :  — 

Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

May  7th,  3  p.  m.,  1864. 
Orders. 

The   following  movements   are   ordered   for  to-day   and    to 
night  : 

1 .  The  trains  of  the  Sixth  Corps  authorized  to  accompany 
the  troops  will  be  moved  at  four  o'clock  p.  M.,  to  Chancellorsville, 
and  parked  on  the  left  of  the  road,  and  held  ready  to  follow  the 
Sixth  Corps  during  the  night  march. 

2.  The  trains  of  the  Fifth  Corps  authorized  to  accompany 
the  troops  will  be  moved  at  five  o'clock  p.  M.,  to  Chancellorsville, 
following  the  trains  of  the  Sixth  Corps  and  parking  with  them, 
and  held  ready  to  follow  those  trains  in  the  movement  to-night. 

3.  The  trains  of  the  Second  Corps  authorized  to  accompany 
the  troops  will  be  moved  at  six  o'clock  p.  M.,  to  Chancellorsville, 
and   park  on  the  right  of  the  road,  and  held  ready  to  move  at 
same  hour  with  the  other  trains  by  way  of  the  Furnaces  to  Todd's 
Tavern,  keeping-  cle  fir  of  the  Brock  Road  which  will  he  used  by  the 
troops. 

4.  Corps  commanders  will  send  escorts  with  these  trains. 

5.  The  Reserve  Artillery  will  move  at  seven  o'clock  by  way 
of  Chancellorsville,  Aldrich,  and  Piney  Branch  Church  to  the  inter 
section  of  the  road  from  Piney  Branch  Church  to  Spottsylvania 
Court  House,   and  the  road  from  Alsop's  to   Block   House,   and 
park  to  the  rear  on  the  last  named  road,  so  as  to  give  room  for 
the  Sixth  Corps. 

6.  At  half-past  eight  o'clock  P.  M.    Major-Genera]  Warren, 
commanding  the  fifth  Corps,  ~will  move  to  Spottsvlvania  Court 
House  by  way  of  the  Brock  road  and  Todd's  Tavern. 

7.  At  half-past  eight  o'clock  p.  M.    Major-General  Sedgwick, 
commanding  the  Sixth  Corps,    will  move  by  the  pike  and  plank 
roads  to  Chancellorsville,  where  he  will  be  joined  by  the  author 
ized  trains  of  his  own  corps  and  those  of  the  Fifth  Corps;  thence 
by  way  of  Aldrich's  and  Piney  Branch  Church  to  the  intersection 
of  the  road  from  Piney  Branch  Church  to  Spottsylvania  Court 
House  and  the  road  from  Alsop's  to  Block  House.     The  trains  of 
the  Fifth  Corps  will  then  join  its  corps  at  Spottsylvania   Court 
House. 

8.  Major-General  Hancock,  commanding  Second  Corps,  will 
move  to  Todd's  Tavern  by  the  Brock  Road,  following  the  Fifth 
Corps  closely. 

9.  Headquarters   during  the  movement   will   be   along  the 


13 


route  of  the  Fifth  and  Second  Corps,  and  at  the  close  of  the  move 
ment  near  the  Sixth  Corps. 

10.  The  pickets  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  will  be  with 
drawn  at  one  o'clock  A.  M.,  and  those  of  the  Second  Corps  at  two 
o'clock  A.  M.,  and  will  follow  the  routes  of  their  respective  Corps. 

11.  The  cavalry  now  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Ham 
mond  will  be  left  by  General  Sedgwick  at  the  Old  Wilderness  Tav 
ern,    and    upon  being  informed  by  General  Hancock  of  the  with 
drawal  of  his  corps  and  pickets  will  follow  that  corps. 

12.  Corps   commanders   will   see  that   the   movements    are 
made  with  punctuality  and  promptitude. 

13.  Major-General  Sheridan,   commanding'  Cavalry   Corps, 
will  have  a  sufficient  force  on  the  approaches  from  the  right  to 
keep  the  corps  commanders  advised  in  time  of  the  approach  of  the 
enemy. 

14.  It  is  understood  that  General  Burnside's  command  will 
follow  the  Sixth  Corps. 

Bv  command  of  Major-General  Meade, 

S.  Williams, 

Asst.  AdjutantGcneral. 

It  will  be  observed  that  by  this  order  General 
Sheridan  was  relieved  from  responsibility  for  the 
trains,  which  were  to  be  parked  on  the  left  flank  of 
the  army,  and  it  is  manifest  that  his  especial  instruc 
tions  prc-supposed  and  necessitated  his  occupation 
of  the  Brock  Road,  for  without  that  the  instructions 
*of  the  orders  could  not  he  obeyed. 

It  is  noticeable,  and  significant,  that  General 
Sheridan  omits  all  reference  to  the  proposed  move 
ments  of  the  infantry  and  artillery  from  his  account 
of  his  operations  during  the  afternoon  and  evening 
of  the  7th.  It  is  true  General  Grant  states  (Vol.  2. 
p.  210):  "During  the  7th  Sheridan  had  a  fight  with 
the  rebel  cavalry  at  Todd's  Tavern,  but  routed  them, 
thus  opening  the  way  for  the  troops  that  were  to  go 
by  that  route  at  night,11  and  possibly  this  may  be 
taken  as  an  endorsement  of  General  Sheridan's  an 
nouncement  to  General  Meade  "that  moving  col 
umns  of  infantry  should  take  care  of  their  own 


14 


fronts,"  but,  even  if  justification  of  his  neglect  of  the 
manifest  requirements  of  the  orders  of  his  comman 
der  can  be  found  in  that  theory,  the  fact  that  posses 
sion  was  disputed  by  Confederate  cavalry  still  de 
volved  upon  General  Sheridan  the  duty  of  securing 
the  road  under  his  other  dictum  —  "our  cavalry 
ought  to  fight  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  our  infan 
try  the  enemy's  infantry."  It  would  seem,  therefore, 
that  he  should  have  furnished  for  the  information  of 
the  future  historian  some  more  definite,  and  more 
pleasantly  comprehensible,  reason  than  he  has  vouch 
safed  for  the  surrender  of  what  he  had  gained,  and 
for  his  failure  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the 
order  from  Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac. 

The  allegation  that  interference  by  General  Meade 
wnth  the  orders  given  by  General  Sheridan  after  he 
had  "encamped  Gregg's  and  Merritt's  divisions  in 
the  open  fields  to  the  east  of  Todd's  Tavern,"  pre 
vented  the  occupation  of  the  approaches  to  Spottsyl- 
vania  Court  House  by  the  Federal  cavalry  and  en 
abled  the  enemy  to  secure  possession  of  that  point, 
originated  in  General  Sheridan's  official  report  of 
May  13, 1866,  and  was  embodied  by  General  Badeau 
in  his  Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant.  The  feebleness 
of  the  attempted  aspersion  of  General  Meade,  in  the 
interests  of  General  Sheridan,  was  clearly  exposed  by 
General  A.  A.  Humphreys,  in  "The  Virginia  Cam 
paign  of  1864  and  1865,"  but,  nevertheless,  the  story 
was  repeated  by  General  Grant  in  his  Memoirs,  and 
is  now  again  asserted,  with  a  slight  variation,  by 
General  Sheridan  on  pages  365  and  366  of  his  first 
volume.  He  says  :  — 

General  Grant  now  felt  that  it  was  necessar\r  to  throw  him 
self  on  Lee's  communications  if  possible,  while  preserving  his 


15 


own  intact  by  prolonging  the  movement  to  the  left.  Therefor,  on 
the  evening  of  the  7th  he  determined  to  shift  his  whole  army 
toward  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  and  initiated  the  movement 
by  a  night  march  of  the  infantry  to  Todd's  Tavern.  In  view  of 
what  was  contemplated,  I  gave  orders  to  Gregg  and  Merritt  to 
move  at  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  for  the  purpose  of 
gaining  possession  of  Snell's  Bridge  over  the  Po  River,  the  former 
by  the  crossing  at  Corbin's  Bridge  and  the  latter  by  the  Block 
House.  .  .  .  During  the  night  of  the  7th  General  Meade 
'arrived  at  Todd's  Tavern  and  modified  the  orders  I  had  given 
Gregg  and  Merritt,  etc.,  etc. 

Space  forbids  the  unnecessan^  repetition  of  the 
details  of  the  unanswerable  (  re-assertion  is  not  an 
answer )  refutation  ot  this  astonishing  confusion  of 
time,  place,  circumstance,  and  imagination,  so  per 
sistently  asserted.  It  is  sufficient  to  note  only  .two 
or  three  points. 

We  have  already  seen  General  Meade 's  order  as 
issued  to  his  command.  On  page  208  of  his  second 
volume,  General  Grant  gives  his  order,  upon  which 
General  Meade's  was  based.  It  commences  :  — 

Headquarters,  Armies  of  ihe  U.  S. 

May  7,  1861,  6:30  a.  m. 
Major-General  Meade, 

Commanding  A.  P. 

Make  all  preparations  during  the  day  for  a  night  march  to 
take  position  at  Spottsylvania  C.  H.  with  one  corps,  at  Todd's 
Tavern  with  one,  and  another  near  the  intersection  of  the  Pine\r 
Branch  and  Spottsylvania  road  with  the  road  from  Alsop's  to 
Old  Court. House. 

General  Sheridan's  own  order  to  his  cavalry, 
which  General  Meade  is  said  to  have  modified  and 
rendered  ineffective,  as  it  eventually  reached  General 
Gregg,  is  as  follows  :  — 

May  8th,  1  a.  m. 

Move  with  your  command  at  5  a.  m.,  on  the  Catharpin 
Road,  crossing  at  Corbin's  Bridge,  and  taking  position  at  Shady 
Grove  Church.  General  Merritt  will  follow  you,  and  at  Shady 
Grove  Church  will  take  the  left  hand,  or  Block  House  Road,  mov 
ing  forward  and  taking  up  position  at  that  point  [viz.,  Block 
House].  Immediately  after  he  has  passed,  you  will  move  forward 


16 

with  your  division,  on  the  same  road,  to  the  crossing  of  Po  River, 
where  you  will  take  up  position  supporting  General  Merritt. 
General  Wilson  with  his  division  will  march  from  Alsop's  by  way 
of  Spottsylvania  Court  House  and  the  Gate  to  Snell's  Bridge, 

where   he  will   take  up  position The   infantry   march 

to  Spottsylvania  to-night. 

It  is  very  clear  from  these  orders  alone  that  Gen 
eral  Sheridan  is  in  error  in  stating  that  General 
Grant,  on  the  evening'  of  the  seventh,  determined 
upon  the  Spottsylvania  movement  and  initiated  it  hy 
a  night  march  of  the  infantry  to  T odd's  Tavern. 

Generals  Badeau,  Grant,  and  Humphreys  concur 
in  fixing  the  time  of  General  Meade's  arrival  at  Todd  's 
Tavern  at  about  midnight.  The  divisions  of  Generals 
Gregg  and  Merritt  at  that  time  lay  in  bivouac  con 
fronting  the  enemy,  the  former  upon  the  Catharpin 
Road,  and  the  latter  upon  the  Brock  Road,  so  as  to 
clear  the  ground  around  the  Tavern.  Discovering 
that  General  Sheridan  was  not  with  his  troops,  and 
that  both  Generals  Gregg  and  Merritt  were  without 
orders  ;  and  knowing  that  the  head  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
column  would  soon  arrive,  and  that  instant  action 
was  necessary  to  any  possible  success  in  the  move 
ment  which  had  commenced,  General  Meade  gave  the 
orders  for  the  only  dispositions  that  then  remained 
practicable  for  the  cavalry.  He  gave  his  instructions 
at  one  o'clock  a.  m.,  himself  writing  the  orders,  and 
also  the  notification  sent  to  General  Sheridan,  and 
did  not  countermand  or  modify  the  order  of  General 
Sheridan,  for  that  officer's  orders  reached  the  troops 
after  those  of  General  Meade  had  been  issued.  That 
General  Meade's  orders  could  not  have  prevented  the 
success  of  General  Sheridan's  plans  and  combinations, 
is  abundantly  shown  by  the  fact  that,  at,  and  from, 
the  time  when  General  Sheridan  's  orders  were  writ 
ten,  the  roads  upon  which  he  ordered  his  troops  to 


17 


operate  from  T odd's  Tavern  were  held  in  force  by 
the  moving  columns  of  the  enemy.  This  fact  is 
established  beyond  the  reach  of  controversy  by  the 
official  reports  of  Generals  Pendleton,  Anderson, 
Ewell,  and  Early,  of  the  Confederate  Army  ;  by  the 
official  report,  and  by  the  Personal  Memoirs  (vol.  2. 
page  211  )  of  General  Grant;  by  General  Badeau's 
Military  History  (vol.  2.  page  138  );  and  by  General 
Sheridan  himself  when,  on  page  368  of  his  first  vol 
ume,  he  states  that  General  Warren,  assaulting 
Spottsylvania  Court  House  on  the  morning  of  the 
8th,  encountered  General  Anderson's  (  Longstreet's  ) 
corps.  That  corps  was  known  to  have  been  in  posi 
tion  in  the  Wilderness  lines  at  eleven  o'clock  on  the 
night  of  the  7th  and  could  not  have  reached 
Spottsylvania  Court  House,  as  correctly  stated  by 
General  Sheridan,  except  via  the  Catharpin  and 
Shady  Grove  roads.  It  may  also  be  well  to  note 
here  that  Snell  's  Bridge,  the  possession  of  which  is  in 
sisted  upon  as  of  the  utmost  importance  by  Generals 
Badeau  and  Sheridan,  is  situated  about  two  miles 
south  oi  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  entirely  out  of 
General  Lee  Js  line  of  march,  and,  although  open  to 
them,  was  not  used  (  see  official  reports  )  by  the  Con 
federate  Armv  in  this  movement. 

Referring  again  to  General  Sheridan  's  order  of 
May  8th,  1  a.  m.,  it  will  be  noted  that  it  entirely 
ign ores  -the  presence  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  upon 
the  Brock  Road.  When  General  Merritt  received  his 
instructions  from  General  Meade,  his  command  lay 
in  contact  with  this  cavalry  force,  probably,  about 
a  mile  east  of  Todd  's  Tavern.  The  subsequent  arri 
val  of  the  infantry  produced  no  such  confusion  at  the 
front  as  is  claimed  by  Generals  Badeau  and  Sheri 
dan.  The  writer  can  affirm  this  of  his  own  personal 


IS 


knowledge,  supported  by  the  statement  of  General 
(then  Lieutenant-Colonel)  Fred.  T.  Locke,  Assistant 
Adjutant- General,  Fifth  Army  Corps,  that  upon  the 
arrival  of  the  head  of  the  infantry  column  at  Todd  's 
Tavern  he  found  the  road  blocked  by  the  Provost 
Marshal's  train  and  the  headquarters  escorts  — 
as  had  also  occurred  at  General  Hancock's  head 
quarters  soon  after  the  column  had  started  —  and 
that  it  became  absolutely  necessary  to  halt  there 
and  wait  for  light.  General  Merritt  commenced  his 
efforts  to  clear  the  road  immediately  on  receiving  his 
orders  about  one  o'clock  a.  m.  General  Warren, 
with  the  head  of  his  column,  reached  the  headquart 
ers  of  the  cavalry  division  about  three  o'clock  a.  m., 
when  he  halted  and  massed  his  troops  in  the  rear  of 
the  cavalry.  At  General  Merritt 's  suggestion,  when 
near  the  Alsop  forks  of  the  road,  General  Warren 
relieved  the  cavalry  skirmish  line  with  his  infantrv 
about  six  o'clock  a.  m.,  and  not  u  about  11  o'clock  " 
as  stated  by  General  Sheridan.  The  Fifth  Corps  then 
advanced  along  the  Brock  Road  and  assaulted  the 
enemy  holding  that  road  near  the  Court  House  at 
the  same  time  that  General  Wilson's  cavalry  division 
pushed  through  upon  the  Fredeiicksburg  Road.  The 
report  of  General  W.  N.  Pendleton,  Chief  of  Artillery, 
Army  of  North  Virginia,  says  :  — 

About  9  a.  m.  of  the  8th  the  head  of  the  column  came  in 
sight  of  the  Court  House,  and  found  the  enemy  just  getting  into 
view  on  the  Fredericksburg  Road,  driving  back  a  small  cavalry 
force  which  there  opposed  them.  At  the  same  time  a  strong  infan 
try  column  assailed  another  cavalry  force  which  disputed  their 
advance  on  the  Todd  's  Tavern  Road. 

In  his  report  of  May  13,  1866,  and  in  his  Mem 
oirs,  General  Sheridan  states  that  when  he  learned  of 
the  orders  given  to  Generals  Gregg  and  Merritt  by 
General  Meade  he  for  a  time  had  fears  for  the  safety 


19 


of  General  Wilson,  but  that  General  Wilson  held 
Spottsylvania  Court  House  until  driven  out  by  Gen 
eral  Anderson  's  command.  He  quotes  a  despatch 
sent  to  him  by  General  Wilson  at  9  o'clock  a.  ni.,  of 
May  8th,  which  says  :  — 

Have  run  the  enemy's  cavalry  a  mile  from  Spottsylvania  Court 
House;  have  charged  them,  and  drove  them  through  the  village; 
am  fighting  now  with  a  considerable  force,  supposed  to  be  Lee  's 
division.  Every  thing  all  right. 

Evidently  General  Wilson  was  oppressed  by  no 
fears  as  to  his  own  situation,  and  the  report  of 
General  Pendleton,  just  referred  to,  bears  testimony 
to  the  effective  fire  of  his  guns  which  opened  "  a  flank 
reverse  fire  "  upon  the  deploying  forces  of  the  enemy. 
General  Badeau  (  Vol  2,  p.  141.  foot  note  )  says:— 

As  soon  as  Sheridan  learned  the  change  \vhich  Meade  had 
made  in  the  orders  to  Merritt  and  Gregg,  and  the  consequent 
isolation  of  Wilson,  he  scut  orders  to  that  officer  to  fall  back 
from  Spottsylvania. 

General  Sheridan  makes  no  mention  of  this  order 
in  either  his  report  or  Memoirs,  but  the  report  of 
General  John  Bratton,  C.  S.  Army,  states:  — 

We  moved  ...  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  and 
arrived  in  the  vicinity  on  the  next  morning  (the  8th  )  at  about  10 
o'clock  to  find  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  possession  of  and  between 
us  and  the  court  house.  My  brigade  formed  on  the  right  of  the 
road  and  moved  down  to  the  court  house,  the  enemy  retiring  be 
fore  us  and  abandoning  the  place  without  a  fight. 

General  Wilson  was  "all  right"  at  nine  o'clock 
and  certainly,  with  the  advancing  Fifth  Corps  in 
sight,  would  not  have  retired  as  General  Bratton 
describes  at  ten  o'clock,  except  in  obedience  to  or 
ders. 

Having  been  relieved  by  the  infantry  of  the  Fifth 
Corps,  General  Merritt 's  division  remained  upon 
and  along  the  Brock  Road,  awaiting  orders,  until 
about  eleven  o'clock,  and  was  then  withdrawn  to 


20 


the  rear.  There  was  in  the  army  no  gallanter  com 
mand  than  that  division  whose  brigades  were  led  by 
Devin,  Custer  and  Gibbs.  There  was  but  one  thing 
that  prevented  its  movement  to  the  left  of  the  ad 
vancing  infantry  and  to  such  cooperation  in  the 
assault  upon  the  Court  House  as  would  speedily 
have  effected  a  junction  with  General  Wilson's  divis 
ion  and  the  repulse  of  the  Confederate  forces.  The 
one  thing  preventing  was  the  absence  of  "a  loyal 
determination  to  aid  zealously  in  all  the  plans  "  of 
the  campaign  on  the  part  of  the  commander  of  the 
Cavalry  Corps,  who,  to  use  again  his  own  words, 
allowed  two  divisions  of  cavalry  to  remain  practi- 
callv  ineffective  by  reason  of  disjointed  and  irregular 
instructions  from  their  commander.  The  official 
returns  place  the  strength  of  the  Cavalry  Corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  about  twelve  thousand 
men,  and  that  of  the  Cavalry  Corps  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  about  eight  thousand  men. 
General  Sheridan  states  that,  after  furnishing  the 
various  details  necessary  for  detached  duty,  he 
crossed  the  Rapidan  with  an  effective  force  of  about 
ten  thousand  troopers.  A  similar  deduction  from 
the  reported  strength  of  the  Confederate  Cavalry 
would  put  General  Stuart 's  effective  force  at  less 
than  seven  thousand.  General  Sheridan  had  been 
very  positive  in  his  assurance  to  General  Meade  that 
if  allowed  to  go  out  and  hunt  for  the  enemy 's 
cavalry,  he  could  soon  destroy  it.  On  the  7th  of 
May,  1864,  the  Confederate  troopers  confronted 
him.  He  was  hampered  by  no  orders  other  than  to 
place  himself  in  position  to  give  due  warning  of  any 
approach  of  the  enemy  upon  the  right  of  the  army  ; 
and  yet  he  claims  for  himself  that  he  deemed  it  pru 
dent  to  surrender  the  Brock  Road  to  the  enemv  's 


cavalry,  and  thus  suffered  the  advance  of  the  army 
to  be  checked  at  Todd  's  Tavern,  and  that,  when  on 
the  morning  on  the  8th  opportunity  offered  to  re 
trieve  the  error,  he  withdrew  his  troops  and  neglect 
ed  to  aid  in  the  assault  upon  Spottsylvania  Court 
House.  The  Cavalry  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  had  never  had  such  a  record  put  upon  it 
before.  Even  General  Badeau  wails:  "It  certainly 
seems  that  a  greater  degree  of  vigor  shown  by  the 
corps  commanders  at  the  front  would  not  have  al 
lowed  the  prize  of  the  entire  movement  to  slip  from 
their  grasp,"  —  and  General  Badeau  is  right  in  all 
save  the  use  of  the  plural.  General  Sheridan  was 
the  only  corps  commander  who  could,  or  should, 
have  been  at  the  front  when  the  success  of  the  move 
ment  was  possible. 

It  is  difficult,  and  by  no  means  pleasant  to  any 
true  American,  to  understand  how  a  General  com 
manding  the  Army  of  the  United  States  could  have 
written  General  Sheridan  's  account  of  his  interview 
with  General  Meade  a  little  before  noon  on  May  8th, 
1864.  Doubtless  General  Meade  did  exhibit  some 
traces  of  "peppery  temper"  on  that  occasion.  There 
can  be  found  on  record  few  military  saints  who,  in 
the  presence  of  the  enemy,  could,  or  would,  quietly 
submit  to  being  charged  with  imbecility  in  their 
command,  and  defied  in  their  authority,  by  a  subal 
tern.  Officers  have  forfeited  life,  as  well  as  honor,  for 
less  than  General  Sheridan  claims. 

However,  with  this  interview7,  and  its  results, 
General  Sheridan  has  given  to  the  world  the  key  to 
the  intricacies  of  the  Military  History  and  Personal 
Memoirs  of  General  Grant,  as  they  relate  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  and  its  Commander. 

He  states  that,  when  General  Meade  visited  General 


22 

Grant  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Armies  of  the  United 
States,  and  there,  in  relating  the  circumstances  of 
the  "acrimonious  interview"  just  had,  mentioned 
that  General  Sheridan  had  asserted  that  he  could 
whip  Stuart  if  he  (  General  Meade  )  would  only  let 
him,  General  Grant's  reply  was,  "Did  he  say  so? 
Then  let  him  go  out  and  do  it;"  that  the  intimation 
was  immediately  acted  upon  by  General  Meade,  and 
that  a  little  later  he  received  from  that  officer  his 
orders  for  the  "Richmond  Raid."  General  Grant, 
however,  gives  a  somewhat  different  coloring  to  the 
matter.  In  volume  2,  page  153,  he  says:  On  the 
8th  of  May,  just  after  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness 
and  when  we  were  moving  on  Spottsylvania  I  di 
rected  Sheridan  verbally  to  cut  loose  from  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  pass  around  the  left  of  Lee  's  army 
and  attack  his  cavalry :  .  .  .  ."  General  Humph 
reys  expresses  it:  "At  1  p.  m.,  by  order  of  General 
Grant,  General  Sheridan  was  directed  to  concentrate 
his  available  mounted  force  and  move  against  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  .  .  ."  At  noon  of  May  8,  Gen 
eral  Meade's  headquarters  were  near  Todd  's  Tavern, 
and  General  Grant 's  were  at  Piney  Branch  Church, 
about  two  miles  from  the  Tavern.  The  described 
interview  with  General  Sheridan  ;  the  visit  to  General 
Grant 's  headquarters  and  the  conference  with  the 
Lieutenant-General ;  the  giving  of  the  necessary 
instructions,  and  the  issuing  of  the  one  o'clock  order 
for  the  raid ;  very  fully  occupied  the  little  more  than 
an  hour  from  the  time  when  General  Sheridan  says 
that  General  Meade  sent  for  him.  No  one  has  stated 
at  what  time  on  the  8th  of  May,  before  one  o'clock 
p.  m.,  General  Grant  took  occasion  to  give  his  verbal 
instructions  to  General  Sheridan. 

General   Badeau  (  Vol.  2,  p.  52  )   states   that,    on 


23 


the  recommendation  of  General  Grant,  General  Buell 
was  promptly  dismissed  from  the  army  when  he  de 
clined  to  accept  the  offer  of  the  command  of  a  corps 
under  General  Sherman,  his  junior  in  rank.  General 
Sheridan,  if  the  language  of  his  Memoirs  has  weight 
in  evidence,  neglected  the  orders  and  rebelled  against 
the  authority  of  his  superior  and  commanding  offi 
cer,  and  Lieutenant-General  Grant  ordered  him  to 
the  separate  command  that  he  coveted.  It  remained, 
however,  for  the  last  General  of  the  U.S.  Army  to 
boast  of  the  fact  to  the  country  that  had  elevated 
him,  and  to  leave  the,  at  least,  questionable  prece 
dent  as  a  legacy  to  the  Army  for  whose  esprit  and 
discipline  he  was  thought  to  have  been  intelligently 
responsible. 

What,  better  than  his  own  \vords,  can  indicate 
the  nature  of  the  "events  "that  General  Sheridan 
was  "conscious,"  even  before  the  opening  of  the 
campaign  of  1864,  \vould  produce  the  "pressure11 
under  which  General  Meade  "would  be  compelled 
sooner  or  later  to  change  his  mind  or  partially  give 
way?"  Certainly  no  clearer  light  than  their  own 
pages  furnish  need  be  thrown  upon  the  animus  of 
the  Military  History  and  the  Personal  Memoirs  of 
General  Grant,  in  connection  with  the  Personal 
Memoirs  of  P.  H.  Sheridan. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  make  any  comparison  be 
tween  the  conduct  held  by  General  Meade  toward 
General  Sheridan  and  that  confessed  by  General 
Grant  toward  General  Meade.  Even  Generals  Grant 
and  Badeau  are  forced  to  acknowledge  that  General 
Meade  was  a  very  loyal  gentleman  and  soldier. 

Some  months  after  the  preceding  pages  were 
written,  the  report  of  the  Association  of  the  Gradu- 


24 


ates  of  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy,  June  12,  1889, 
has  been  published  containing  a  memoir  of  General 
Sheridan  by  General  Jas.  H.  Wilson.  It  is  believed 
that  expressions  used  therein  relieve  this  memoir  of 
much  of  the  sanctity  usually  accorded  to  obituary 
writings  and  permit  the  use  of  brief  reference  and 
quotation  here. 

General  Wilson  relates  that,  by  open  mutiny  on 
parade  and  by  assault  upon  a  Cadet  Sergeant  whose 
duty  required  that  he  should  reprimand  and  report 
Cadet  P.  H.  Sheridan  for  offences  against  discipline, 
Cadet  Sheridan  earned  a  suspension  of  a  year  which 
turned  him  back  one  class  in  his  course  at  the  Mili 
tary  Academy.  The  account  concludes  with  the 
unique  eulogium  :  — 

In  this  incident  the  boy  displayed  the  MOST  MARKED  charact 
eristic  of  the  man,  and  the  one  to  which  he  was  PRINCIPALLY 
INDEBTED  for  the  high  rank  and  great  distinction  which  he  reach 
ed  in  the  war  of  the  Rebellion. 

After  this  frank  confession  by  one  of  General 
Sheridan's  most  persistent  and  enthusiastic  panegyr 
ists,  one  reads  with  some  surprise,  a  little  further  on, 
the  statement :  — 

He  was  not  one  of  those  pedantic  grumbling  fellows  who 
always  knew  more  than  their  commanding-  officer  and  never  ap 
proved  the  plan  they  were  expected  to  carry  out.  He  was  THE 
PRINCE  OF  SUBORDINATE  COMMANDERS,  and  by  his  unfailing  alac 
rity  won  his  way  straight  to  the  confidence  of  those  in  authority 
over  him. 

Still  a  little  further  on,  and  General  Wilson  is 
moved  to  admiration  of  the  fact  that  General  Sheri 
dan  "never  failed  in  a  doubtful  situation  to  contend 
to  the  utmost  for  victory,  nor  to  claim  it  strenuously 
whether  he  had  clearly  won  it  or  not." 

In  connection  with  this  last  .quotation,  the 
following  extract  from  the  concluding  paragraphs  of 


25 


General  Sheridan  's  official  report  of  May  13,  1866, 
is  not  without  interest :  — 

It  will  be  seen  by  this  report  that  we  led  the  advance  of  the 
army  to  the  Wilderness ;  that  on  the  Richmond  raid  we  marked 
out  its  line  of  march  to  the  North  Anna,  where  we  found  it  on  our 
return;  that  we  again  led  its  advance  to  Hanovertown,  and 
thence  to  Cold  Harbor;  that  we  removed  the  enemy's  cavalry 
from  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy  b}-  the  Trevillian  raid, 
and  thereby  materially  assisted  the  army  in  its  successful  march 
to  the  James  River  and  Petersburg,  where  it  remained  until  we 
made  the  campaign  in  the  valley ;  marched  back  to  Petersburg, 
and  again  took  its  advance  and  led  it  to  victory. 

It  is  believed  that,  unless,  perhaps,  in  the  pages 
of  the  Personal  Memoirs  of  P.  H.  Sheridan,  this 
paragraph  cannot  be  surpassed  in  military  litera 
ture. 


26 


FIVE  FORKS. 


In  the  History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  the 
author,  General  Francis  A.  Walker,  referring  to  the 
removal  of  General  Warren  from  his  command  after 
the  battle  of  Five  Forks,  Va.,  April  1,  1865,  re 
marks  :  — 

What  is  infinitely  to  be  regretted  is,  that  the  brilliant  and 
fortunate  successor  of  Grant  and  Sherman  did  not,  when  the  heat 
of  action  had  passed,  when  the  passions  of  the  moment  had 
cooled,  himself  seize  the  opportunity  which  his  own  power  and 
fame  afforded  him,  to  take  the  initiative  in  vindicating  the 
reputation  of  one  of  the  bravest,  brightest,  and  most  spirited  of 
the  youthful  commanders  of  the  Union  Armies.  It  would  not 
have  diminished  the  renown  which  Sheridan  won  at  \ellow 
Tavern,  Cedar  Creek,  and  Five  Forks,  had  he  welcomed  an 
earlv  occasion  to  repair  the  terrible  injury  which  one  hastv 
word,  in  the  heat  of  battle,  had  done  to  the  position,  the  fame, 
and  the  hopes  of  the  man  who  snatched  Little  Round  Top  from 
the  hands  of  the  exulting  Confederates. 

Neither  General  Adam  Badeau,  sixteen  years  af 
ter  the  battle  of  Five  Forks,  nor  General  Grant,  five 
years  later,  nor  General  Sheridan,  two  years  later 
still,  have  been  able  to  comprehend  this  fact  stated 
by  General  Walker;  and  yet,  General  Badeau,  un 
questionably  speaking  for,  and  of,  his  principals, 
with  due  rhetorical  introduction  announces  that, 
"no  one  but  a  hero  is  fit  to  command  armies." 

Imaginings  of  Deity  take  many  an  awkward  and 


27 


grotesque  shape  while  worship  advances  from  fetich- 
ism  to  enlightened  adoration,  and  between  the  denial 
of  the  valet  and  the  verdict  of  history  there  are 
many  varying  and  often  contradictory  applications 
of  the  title  Hero.  In  the  quotation  just  made,  Gen 
eral  Walker  has  suggested  one  line  of  thought  con 
necting  generalship  with  heroism.  General  Badeau, 
more  in  accord  with  so-called  practical  conceptions, 
somewhat  limits  his  ideal  by  the  dogma,  "in  military 
matters  nothing  which  is  successful,  is  wrong."  As 
yet  another  perception,  the  words  of  the  late  Mr. 
Chas.  Gibbons,  of  Philadelphia,  are  suggestive.  Said 
Mr.  Gibbons :  — 

Heroism  is  not  an  uncommon  virtue.  There  are  others 
more  rare  and  no  less  essential  in  forming'  the  character  of  a 
great  soldier.  All  American  soldiers  North  and  South,  have 
proved  themselves  heroes,  but  we  cannot  expect  to  find  in  every 
one  a  Thomas,  a  Washington  or  a  Meade.  Such  men  are  not 
common  in  an}'  country.  They  seem  to  be  set  for  special  occa 
sions  and  as  examples.  They  do  not  thrust  themselves  into  no 
tice.  They  do  not  come  swaggering  into  the  history  of  the  times. 
They  are  not  vain-glorious  nor  envious.  They  "bear  their  facul 
ties"  meekly,  and  are  guided  by  a  better  cynosure  than  their  own 
personal  renown. 

It  is  purposed  to  glance  briefly  at  the  account 
now  given  by  General  Sheridan-  of  the  part  taken  by 
General  Warren,  with  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  in  the 
battle  of  Five  Forks.  While  General  Sheridan's  final 
statements  and  arguments  add  nothing  to  asser 
tions  already  often  repeated,  a  consideration  of  the 
method  and  circumstance  of  their  persistent  presen 
tation  may  throw  light  upon  the  character  of  the 
heroism  of  that  officer  and  his  consequent  right  to 
command  the  following  of  soldiers,  or  the  attention 
of  the  public,  to  the  prejudice  of  an  illustrious  con 
temporary. 

In  his  account   of  the  operations   of  March   30, 


28 


1865,  General  Sheridan's  first  reference  to  General 
Warren  mentions  (Vol  2.  p.  146)  the  hasty  call  he 
made  at  the  headquarters  of  that  officer  in  the  after 
noon,  after  his  visit  to  General  Grant's  headquar 
ters,  and  states  that  he  found  General  Warren 
"speaking  rather  despondently  of  the  outlook,  being 
influenced  no  doubt  by  the  depressing  weather." 
The  remark  is  worthy  of  note  only  because  it  is  the 
first  of  a  series  of  statements.  Considering  the  con 
dition  of  affairs  at  General  Grant's  headquarters,  as 
described  by  General  Sheridan,  there  is  not  much  to 
occasion  surprise  or  comment  in  the  statement. 
General  Sheridan  continues:  "From  Warren's  head 
quarters  I  returned  by  the  Boydton  Road  to  Dinwid- 
die  Court  House,  fording  Gravelly  Run  with  ease." 
The  brevity  and,  in  connection  with  succeeding 
assertions,  the  evident  intent  of  this  statement,  call 
to  mind  certain  portions  of  the  evidence  given  before 
the  court  of  inquiry  ultimately  convened  as  one  of 
the  results  of  the  operations  under  consideration. 
On  pages  1 034-5  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Warren 
Court  of  Inquiry,  the  following  is  recorded  in  the 
testimony  of  General  U.  S.  Grant:— 

Cross-examination  by  Mr.  Stickney,  counsel  for  the  appli 
cant  : 

Q.  When  you  say  "previous  conduct,"  you  mean,  of  course, 
your  understanding  of  his  previous  conduct?  —  A.  Certainly;  of 
course,  always  my  understanding. 

Q.  You  would  admit  quite  as  readily  as  any  other  man  in 
the  world  that  you  might  have  made  a  mistake  in  your  judgment 
upon  those  past  matters?  —  A.  /  am  not  ready  to  admit  that; 
no,  sir. 

Q.  What  you  claim  is  not  that  you  cannot  make  a  mistake, 
but  that  you  did  not  make  a  mistake?  — A.  I  have  no  doubt  I 
made  many  mistakes,  but  not  in  that  particular. 

Q.  In  this  particular  you  do  not  think  you  did  make  one  ?  — 
A.  No. 

On  page  57   of  the  same  record  —  General  Sheri- 


29 


dan  being  under  examination  by   Mr.  Stickney  —  we 
find:- 

Q.  What  papers  have  you  referred  to  in  making  up  this 
statement  which  was  read  before  the  court  ?: — A.  I  have  taken 
copies  from  the  original  papers  in  the  War  Department. 

O.  Have  you  had  or  used  any  other  papers  than  these  copies 
now  in  your  possession  in  preparing  your  present  statement?  —  A. 
None  that  I  know  of  except  an  extract  from  the  report  of  General 
Pickett. 

0.  Did  vou  have  a  pamphlet  of  General  Warren,  among 
other  things  ?  —  A.  Yes;  sir,  I  did  not  consult  it,  I  never  read  it. 

0.     You  did  not  use  that  then  ?  —  A.     ATo,  sir. 

A  recent  eritie  has  said  in  laudation  of  General 
Grant: — "To  any  one  who  knew  much  of  Grant's  pe 
culiar  mental  traits,  it  would  be  quite  easily  believed 
that  when  Grant  had  asserted  either  matter  of  fact 
or  of  opinion  he  quite  naively  assumed  that  the  bur 
den  of  proof  was  on  him  who  questioned  it.  .  .  His 
quiet  but  uiidoubting  confidence  in  himself  was  one 
of  the  conditions  of  his  great  successes."  As  the 
century  opened,  many  were,  in  like  manner,  enrap 
tured  by  Napoleon  —  the  self-crowned  Emperor  of  the 
Continent  —  because  he  "appeared  to  be  of  bronze.'1 
To-day,  there  are  few  who  doubt  that  but  for  the 
character  evinced  in  that  same  much  lauded  "monu 
mental"  carriage  the  pathway  of  the  Emperor  of 
France  would  not  have  led  through  Moscow  to  St. 
Helena.  It  is  something  other  than  naive  self- 
confidence  that —  relying  upon  the  support  of  credu 
lous  popular  prejudice  acquired  —  stolidly  ignores 
all  argument,  or  fact  substantiated,  in  correction  of 
its  assumptions. 

The  insinuation  in  the  manner  of  General  Sheri 
dan's  statement  that  he  forded  Gravelly  Run  with 
ease  late  in  the  afternoon  of  March  30,  while  a  good 
illustration  of  the  pertinacity  in  which  he  rivaled  his 


30 

friend  and  commander  General  Grant,  cajinot  be 
classed  as  ingenuous  or  heroic.  It  was  indelibly  in 
evidence  before  the  Warren  Court  of  Inquiry  (Record 
pp.  155-7)  that,  on  the  night  of  March  31,  Gravelly 
Run,  at  the  crossing  of  the  Boydton  Road,  had  been 
swollen  by  rain  till  it  was  flowing  bank-full  and  \vas 
not  fordable  for  infantry,  but  that  the  necessary 
bridging  was  pushed  with  such  energy  that  the 
march  of  General  Ayres's  division  to  the  relief  of 
General  Sheridan  was  in  no  way  retarded  thereby. 
Of  this  fact  General  Sheridan  could  not  plead  igno 
rance.  On  page  90  of  the  record  of  the  court,  we 
find  that  request  was  made  by  the  President  of  the 
court  that  the  Secretary  of  War  would  authorize 
the  court  record  to  be  printed  from  day  to  day, 
assigning  the  following  as  one  reason  for  the  appli 
cation  :  — 

Lietitenant-Gencral  Sheridan  is  repi'esented  by  counsel ;  and 
as  his  public  duties  will  not  permit  of  his  attendance  through  all 
the  sessions  of  the  court,  the  printing  of  the  record  from  day  to 
day  will  be  of  service  to  him  in  enabling  him  intelligent^  to  aid 
the  court  in  its  inquiry,  as  well  as  to  all  concerned. 

After  a  characteristic  account  of  the  action  be 
tween  his  cavalry  command  and  the  forces  tinder 
General  Pickett,  on  March  31,  General  Sheridan 
(Vol.  2.  p.  154)  continues:  — 

By  following  me  to  Dinwiddie  the  enemy's  infantry  had  com 
plete^'  isolated  itself,  and  hence  there  was  now  offered  the  Union 
troops  a  rare  opportunity.  Lee  was  outside  of  his  works,  just  as 
we  desired,  and  the  general-in-ehief  realized  this  the  moment  he 
received  the  first  report  of  my  situation :  General  Meade  appre 
ciated  it  too  from  the  information  he  got  from  Captain  Sheridan, 
en  route  to  army  headquarters  with  the  first  tidings,  and  sen  I 
this  telegram  to  General  Grant : 

"Headquarters  of  th-j  Army  of  the  Potomac, 

"Maivh81,  18G5.     9.45  P.  M. 
"Lieutenant-General  Grant : 

"Would  it  not  be  well  for  Warren  to  go  down  with  his  whole 


31 


corps  and  smash  up  the  force  in  front  of  Sheridan  ?  Humphreys 
can  hold  the  line  of  the  Boydton  Plank  Road,  and  the  refusal 
along  with  it.  Bartlett's  Brigade  is  now  on  the  road  from  G. 
Boisseau's,  running  north,  where  it  crosses  Gravelly  Run,  he 
having  gone  down  the  White  Oak  Road.  Warren  could  go  at 
once  that  way,  and  take  the  force  threatening  Sheridan  in  rear  at 
Dinwiddie,  and  move  on  the  enemy's  rear  with  the  other  two. 

"G.  G.  Meade,  Major-General." 

An  hour  later  General  Grant  replied  in  these  words : 

"Headquarters  Armies  of  the  United  States, 
"Dabney's  Mills,  March  31st,  1865.     10.15  P.  M. 
"Major-General  Meade, 

"Commanding  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

"Let  Warren  move  in  the  way  you  propose,  and  urge  him  not 
to  stop  for  anything.     Let  Griffin  go  on  as  he  \vas  first  directed. 
"U.  S.  Grant,  Lieutenant-General." 

These  two  despatches  were  the  initiatory  steps  in  sending  the 
Fifth  Corps  under  Major-General  G.  K.  Warren,  to  report  to 
me,  .  . 

In  explanation  of  General  Grant 's  reference  to 
General  Griffin,  General  Sheridan  adds  in  a  foot-note : 
"  Griffin  had  been  ordered  by  Warren  to  the  Boydton 
Road  to  protect  his  rear." 

Again  General  Sheridan  has  neglected  the  record 
printed,  at  public  expense,  in  great  part  for  his  con 
venience  and  benefit,  even  to  the  extent  of  a  very 
imperfect  rendering  of  General  Meade  's  despatch  of 
9:45  p.m.  —  see  record  page  125. 

At  about  five  o  'clock  p.  m.  of  March  31,  General 
Warren  received  from  General  Meade 's  headquarters 
a  despatch,  dated  4:30  p.  m.,  in  which  he  was  di 
rected  to  secure  his  position  on  the  White  Oak  Road ; 
informed  that  it  was  "believed  that  Sheridan  is 
pushing  up"  ;  and  authorized,  if  he  thought  it  \vorth 
while,  to  push  a  small  force  down  the  White  Oak 
Road  to  utry  to  communicate  with  Sheridan;  but 
they  must  take  care  not  to  fire  into  his  advance." 
Before  this  despatch  was  received  the  attention  of 


32 


General  Warren,  and  of  his  command,  had  been 
attracted  by  the  sound  of  General  Sheridan  's  engage 
ment,  and,  as  the  firing  was  heavy  and  evidently 
receding  in  the  direction  of  Dinwiddie  Court  House, 
General  Warren,  not  in  consequence  of  the  despatch, 
but — to  use  his  own  expression — in  consequence  of  his 
duty  as  a  soldier  to  send  re-enforcement,  if  he  could, 
in  the  direction  of  a  portion  of  our  Army  that  was 
evidently  hard  pressed,  on  his  own  responsibility 
ordered  General  Bartlett  to  march  at  once  toward 
the  firing  and  attack  the  enemy  in  the  rear  (  Record, 
pp.  232,  720,  768,  1175).  General  Bartlett  obeyed 
this  order  promptly.  At  5:45  p.  m.  General  Warren 
received  another  despatch  from  General  Meade 's 
headquarters,  dated  5:15  p.  m.,  directing  him  to 
"push  a  brigade  down  the  White  Oak  Road  to  open 
it  for  Generial  Sheridan,  and  support  the  same  if 
necessary."  General  Warren  answered  by  the  fol 
lowing  report :  — 

5:50  p.  m.  March  31. 
General  Webb: 

I  have  just  seen  an  officer  and  a  sergeant  from  General  Sheri 
dan  who  "were  cut  off  in  an  attact  b\'  the  enemy  and  escaped. 
From  what  they  say,  our  cavalry  was  attacked  about  noon  by 
cavalry  and  infantry  and  rapidly  driven  back,  two  divisions, 
Crook 'sand  Devin 's,  being  engaged.  The  firing  seems  to  recede 
from  me  toward  Dinwiddie.  I  have  sent  General  Bartlett  and  my 
escort  in  that  direction,  but  I  think  they  cannot  be  in  time. 

/  hear  cannonading  that  I  think  is  from  near  Dinwiddie  C.  H. 
Resp'lv    G.  K.  Warren,  Maj.  Gen. 

This  was  received  at  General  Meade  's  head 
quarters,  probably  about  6:20  p.  m.,  and  was  un 
doubtedly  the  subject  of  General  Meade 's  missing 
despatch  of  6:35  p.  m.  to  General  Grant,  the  receipt 
of  \vhich  is  acknowledged  in  General  Grant 's  tele 
gram  of  8:45  p.  m.  to  General  Meade.  Captain  M. 
V.  Sheridan  (  Record,  page  212.)  testified  that  he 


38 


reached  General  Meacle  's  headquarters,  en  route  to 
General  Grant  with  General  Sheridan's  message, 
about  7:30  p.  m.,  and  this  agrees  with  General 
Meade's  despatch  to  General  Grant  dated  7:40, 
March  31.  It  is  evident  therefor  that  General  War 
ren  at  5:50  p.  m.  sent  to  the  headquarters  of  the 
Armies  the  first  information  of  General  Sheridan's 
discomfiture,  and  at  the  same  time  gave  assurance  of 
aid  promptly  attempted  in  the  most  effectual  man 
ner.  Although  ignored  by  the  officer  who  in  defiance 
of  orders  neglected  to  open  the  Brock  Road  for  Gen 
eral  Warren  on  May  7,  1864,  and  who  ordered  two 
divisions  of  his  command  to  march  away  from  the 
sound  of  General  Warren 's  opening  battle  on  the 
morning  of  May  8,  1864,  the  record  is  established 
beyond  possibility  of  candid  question. 

About  6:30  p.  m.,  General  Bartlett  having  been 
gone  more  than  an  hour,  General  Warren  received 
from  General  Webb  a  despatch  saying :  — 

A  staff- officer  of  General  Merritt  has  made  a  report  that  the 
enemy  has  penetrated  between  Sheridan's  main  command  and 
your  position.  This  is  a  portion  of  Pickett's  division.  Let  the 
force  ordered  to  move  out  the  White  Oak  Road  move  down  the 
Hoydton  Plank  Road  as  promptly  as  possible. 

To  this  General  Warren  at  once  replied  :  — 

I  have  ordered  General  Pearson,  with  three  regiments  that 
are  now  on  the  plank  road,  right  down  toward  Dinwiddie  C.  II. 
/  will  let  Bnrtlett  work  find  report  result,  as  it  is  too  late  to  stop 
him. 

At  8  p.  m.  General  Warren  received  the  following 
order  from  General  Meade:  — 

Despatch  from  General  Sheridan  says  he  was  forced  back  to 
Dinwiddie  C.  H.  by  strong  force  of  cavalry  supported  by  infantry. 
This  Icnvcs  your  rear  nncl  that  of  the  Second  Corps  on  the  Hovel- 
ton  Plnnk  Kond  open  nnd  will  require  grefit  vigikince  on  your 
part.  If  you  have  sent  the  brigade  down  the  Boydton  plank 
it  should  not  go  farther  than  Gravelly  Run,  as  /  don't  think  it  will 
render  ;iny  service  hut  to  protect  your  re  fir. 


34 


At  8:20  p.  m.  General  Warren  replied  as  fol 
lows  :  — 

I  sent  General  Bartlett  out  on  the  road  running  from  the 
White  Oak  Road  and  left  him  there ;  he  is  nearly  down  to  the 
crossing  of  Gravelly  Run.  This  will  prevent  the  enemy  communi 
cating  by  that  road  tonight.  I  have  about  two  regiments  and 
the  artillery  to  hold  the  plank  road  toward  Dinwiddie  C.  H. 

It  seems  to  me  the  enemy  cannot  remain  between  me  and 
Dinwiddie  if  Sheridan  keeps  fighting-  them,  and  I  believe  they  will 
have  to  fall  back  to  the  Five  Forks.  If  I  have  to  move  to-night  I 
shall  leave  a  good  many  men  who  have  lost  their  way.  Docs 
General  Sheridan  still  hold  Dinwiddie  C.  H. 

At  8:40  p.m.  General  Warren  received  the  follow 
ing  ' '  confidential ' '  despatch  :  — 

The  probability  is  that  we  will  have  to  contract  our  line  to 
night.  You  will  be  required  to  hold,  if  possible,  the  Boydton 
Plank-Road  and  to  Gravelly  Run.  Humphreys  and  Orel  along  the 
run  ;  be  prepared  to  do- this  on  short  notice. 

In  answer  General  Warren  sent  the  following :  — 

8:40  p.  m.,  March  31,  1865. 
Gcnl.  Webb,  C  'h  'f.  Staff: 

The  line  along  the  plank  road  is  very  strong.  One  division, 
with  my  artillery,  I  think  can  hold  it.  If  we  are  not  threatened 
south  of  Gravelly  Run,  east  of  the  plank  road,  Gcnl.  Humphreys 
and  my  batteries,  I  think,  could  hold  this  securely  and  let  me 
move  down  and  attack  the  enemy  at  Dinwiddie  on  one  side  and 
Sheridan  on  the  other.  From  Bartlett 's  position  they  will  have 
to  make  a  considerable  detour  to  re-enforce  their  troops  at  that 
point  from  the  north. 

Unless  Sheridan  has  been  too  badly  handled  I  think  we  have 
a  chance  for  an  open  field  fight  that  should  be  made  use  of. 

Resp'lv.     G.  K.  Warren. 

At  8.50  p.  m.  General  Meade  received  instruc 
tions  from  General  Grant  to  draw  the  Fifth  Corps 
back  to  its  position  on  the  Boydton  Road  and  send, 
at  once,  a  division  of  the  corps  down  that  road  to 
the  relief  of  General  Sheridan.  At  9.17  p.  m.  General 
Warren  received  from  General  Meade  his  orders  for 
drawing  back,  and  instructions  to  send  General  Grif 
fin's  division  to  General  Sheridan.  At  9,35  p.  m. 


35 

the  orders  were  issued  to  the  divisions  of  the  corps. 
At  9.50  p.  m.  General  Warren  was  notified  that  the 
division  intended  for  General  Sheridan's  relief  should 
start  at  once.  At  10  p.  rn.  he  reported  to  General 
Meade  the  conditions  of  the  withdrawal  of  his  com 
mand  from  the  White  Oak  Road,  and  that,  in  order 
to  save  time,  General  Ayres's  division  would  be  sent 
to  Dinwiddie  Court  House  in  place  of  General  Grif 
fin's.  At  10.15  p.  m.  General  Meade  confirmed  this 
substitution  of  General  Ayres  for  General  Griifiii,  hav 
ing  in  the  mean  time  sent  the  9.45  p.  m.  despatch 
to  General  Grant,  suggesting  the  movement  indi 
cated  without  reference  to  General  Warren's  des 
patch  of  8.4-0  p.  m. — probably  on  account  of  Gen 
eral  Grant's  known  prejudice  against  that  officer. 

Details  have  here  been  given  in  order  to  show  the 
character  of  the  record  ignored  by  General  Sheridan. 
That  record  shows  that  General  Griffin's  division 
was  not  usent  by  Warren  to  the  Boydton  Road  to 
protect  his  rear",  as  stated  by  General  Sheridan,  but 
that,  on  the  contrary,  General  Bartlett's  brigade  of 
that  division  was  kept  in  position  to  threaten  the 
rear  of  the  enemy  confronting  General  Sheridan  until 
withdrawn  in  compliance  with  peremptory  orders 
from  General  Grant,  and  further,  that,  at  the  very 
time  General  Grant  was  issuing  his  order  obliging 
that  withdrawal,  General  Warren  was  suggesting  to 
General  Meade  the  proposition  imperfectly  quoted 
by  General  Sheridan  as  evidence  that  Generals  Grant 
and  Meade  realized  and  appreciated  the  rare  oppor 
tunity  that  had  been  placed  within  their  reach  by 
the  Parthian  x  tactics  of  the  cavalry  commander.  All 


quiry  (Re 
been  DRIV 
House. 


in  his  sworn  statement,    submitted 
>rd.  page  51),  lie  expresses  it:     "Dm 
N   BACK  from   l<h<e  Forks   to   withi 


again  referring  to  his  repulse  on  this 
illy  brought  me  the  Fifth  after  my 
d  drawn  the  enemy  from  his  works, 
\  writing  to  the  Warren  Court  of  I  ri 
ng  the  3ist  of  March,  my  cavalry  had 
a  short  distance  of  Dinwiddie  Court 


30 


know  how  difficult  is  the  task  for  human  nature  to 
acknowledge  magnanimity  in  one  it  has  injured  and 
aspersed,  but  could  General  Sheridan  have  grasped 
the  opportunity  here  offered  to  his  hand,  beyond  all 
question  he  would  have  shown  far  higher  general 
ship  than  that  ascribed  to  him  by  General  Grant 
when,  confronted  by  General  Pickett  in  a  broken  and 
wooded  country,  "he  deployed  his  cavalry  on  foot, 
leaving  only  mounted  men  enough  to  take  charge  of 
the  horses." 

General  Sheridan  quotes  in  full  his  well  known 
despatch  to  General  Warren,  dated  April  1,  1865,  3 
a.  m.  The  first  thing  to  be  noted  in  connection  with 
this  despatch  is  that  it  is  an  order  addressed  to  a 
corps  commander  who  was  moving  under  the  per 
sonal  command  of  Major-Gen  era!  Meade.  This  was 
acknowledged  by  General  Sheridan  before  the  court 
of  inquiry,  (Record  pp.  71,  80.),  and  one  cannot  but 
contrast  this  last  reproduction  of  the  order  with  his 
statements  in  regard  to  the  command  of  the  Cavalry 
Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on,  and  just  prior 
to,  May  8,  1864." 

The  next  point  to  be  noted  is  that  the  despatch 
was  dated  "3  a.  m.",  and  that  it  was  received  by 
General  Warren  at  4.50  a.  m.,  as  admitted  (Record, 
p.  200)  by  the  officer  who  carried  the  order  for  Gen 
eral  Sheridan.  General  Sheridan  says  that  he  "never 
once  doubted  that  measures  would  be  taken  to  com 
ply  with"  his  despatch,  when  the  record  shows  that 
it  was  neither  delivered  nor  written  in  time  to  make 
compliance  possible.  In  connection  with  this,  Gen 
eral  Meade's  despatch  to  General  Grant  dated 
April  1,  6  a.  m.,  is  of  interest.  It  commences:  "The 
officer  sent  to  Sheridan  returned  between  2  and  3  a. 
m.  without  any  written  communication,  but  giving 


37 


General  Sheridan'' s  opinion  that  the  enemy  were  re 
tiring  from  his  front.  .  ."  This  was  substantially 
acknowledged  by  General  Sheridan  ( Record,  p.  79  ) 
and  shows  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  concurred  in 
the  opinion  expressed  in  General  Warren's  despatch 
of  8.20  p.  m.  just  quoted. 

General  Sheridan  states :  "As  a  matter  of  fact, 
when  Pickett  was  passing  the  all-important  point 
Warren's  men  were  just  breaking  from  the  bivouac 
in  which  their  chief  had  placed  them  the  night  be 
fore,  .  ."  The  record  —  printed  daily  with  special 
reference  to  General  Sheridan's  convenience  and  bene 
fit —  shows  that  General  Pickett's  troops  began  to 
retire  soon  after  midnight  (Record,  pp.  421, 485, 497, 
511,  et  al.)  in  consequence  of  General  Bartlett's 
movement  upon  their  left  and  rear,  and  that,  with 
the  exception  of  the  rear  guard,  they  were  in  their 
lines  at  Five  Forks  soon  after  sunrise  on  April  1. 

General  Sheridan  says :  "  By  2  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon  Merritt  had  forced  the  enemy  inside  his  in- 
trenchments."  The  record  shows  that  the  Confed 
erate  infantry  lines  were  formed  about  Five  Forks 
before  9  a.  m.,  and  that  they  were  practically  unmo 
lested  in  their  work  of  strengthening  their  lines  until 
the  attack  at  4  o'clock  p.  m.  General  Sheridan  has 
offered  no  explanation  of  the  fact  that,  by  his  order, , 
(Record  p.  21)  12,000  infantry  halted  for  six  hours, 
five  miles  in  time,  and  two  and  one  half  miles  in  dis 
tance,  to  the  rear,  and  allowed  this  work  to  proceed. 
That  six  hours  halt  was  certainly  not  General  War 
ren's  blunder. 

The  imputation  of  unnecessary  delay  in  the 
movement  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  when  at  last  it  was 
ordered  to  the  front,  is  repeated  by  General  Sheridan. 


38 

It  is  enough  here  to  quote  the  words  of  General  War 
ren's  counsel,  Mr.  Stickney :  — 

On  this  point  a  charge  against  Warren  is  a  charge  against 
the  chief  officers  of  his  corps.  .  .  The  commanders  of  Warren's 
divisions  and  brigades  were  men  who  had  been  well  tried.  They 
were  men  who  could  be  safely  trusted  to  bring  their  commands  up 
for  that  attack. 

The  finding  of  the  court  confirms  the  statement. 

General  Sheridan  states  (Vol.  2.  p.  162)  that, 
though  he  did  not  know  how  far  toward  Hatcher's 
Run  the  refused  left  of  the  enemy's  works  extended, 
he  "did  know  where  the  refusal  began,"  and  that  this 
"return"  was  the  point  he  wished  to  assail.  It  was 
in  evidence  before  the  court  of  inquiry,  and  acknowl 
edged  by  General  Sheridan  (Record,  pp.  96,  97,  99, 
115),  that  he  instructed  General  Warren,  when  form 
ing  his  troops  for  assault,  that  .the  "return"  was  in 
the  near  vicinity  of  the  intersection  of  the  Gravelly 
Run  Church  Road  and  the  White  Oak  Road.  Devel 
opments  proved,  however,  that  the  "return"  was  be 
tween  seven  and  eight  hundred  yards  west  of  that 
intersection,  and  General  Ayres  (Record,  pp.  257, 
266,  270)  testifies  in  the  most  precise  manner  that, 
after  his  change  of  direction  to  meet  the  fire  from  the 
"return",  General  Sheridan  came  to  him  "some  three 
times  at  short  intervals  and  expressed  the  same  fear, 
that  he  [I]  had  changed  his  [my]  front  too  soon, 
and  was  engaging  the  cavalry  instead  of  the  enemy; 
that  he  [I]  had  changed  it  before  he  [/]  got  suffi 
ciently  far  north" 

Continuing  his  account  (p.  163),  General  Sheri 
dan  states  that  the  deflection  of  General  Crawford's 
division  "which  finally  brought  it  out  on  the  Ford 
Road  near  C.  Young's  house,  frustrated  the  purpose 
h::  [/]  had  in  mind  when  ordering  the  attack"  On 
the  preceding  page  he  states  :  — 


39 


1  therefore  intended  that  Ayres  and  Crawford  should  attack 
the  refused  trenches  squarely,  and  when«these  two  divisions  and 
Merritt's  cavalry  became  hothr  engaged,  Griffin  's  division  was  to 
pass  around  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line ;  and  I  personally  in 
structed  Griffin  how  I  wished  him  to  go  in,  .  . 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  how  General  Sheri 
dan's  purpose  was  "frustrated"  when,  as  a  result  of 
the  erroneous  information  given  by  General  Sheridan 
concerning  the  location  of  the  "return",  the  division 
of  General  Griffin  was  moved  by  General  Warren's 
order  from  its  place  in  reserve  to  the  right  of  General 
Ayres 's  division,  and  General  Warren,  then  over 
taking  the  diverging  division  of  General  Crawford, 
performed  with  it  the  very  movement  General  Sheri 
dan  has  put  such  stress  upon.  It  is  unnecessary  to 
comment  upon  General  Sheridan's  issuing  instruc 
tions  to  a  division  commander  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
when  the  corps  commander  was  present  and  actively 
engaged  iu . his  duties,  further  than  to  again  recall 
how  bitterly  he  himself  resented  the  fact  that  his 
commanding  officer,  General  Meade,  issued  orders  to 
two  divisions  of  the  Cavalry  Corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  when  the  commander  of  that  corps 
was  absent  from  duty  on  the  night  of  May  7,  1864. 

General  Sheridan  has  seen  fit  again  to  arraign 
General  Warren's  manner.  As  to  that  manner  while 
forming  his  troops  for  the  assault,  it  is  enough  to  re 
fer  to  the  testimony  of  General  Joshua  L.  Chamberlain 
(Record,  p.  236)  who  knew  General  Warren  long  and 
well,  and  who  states  that  at  Gravelly  Run  Church 
he  held  the  manner  of  a  man  intensely  occupied  but 
energetic.  As  to  his  manner  in  the  battle,  it  is  suffi 
cient  to  quote  the  words  of  his  counsel  (Record.  pD. 
1398-9)  as  addressed  to  the  court  that  had  before 
it  the  full  testimony  in  the  case,  and  that  sustained 
the  counsel  by  its  verdict.  Says  Mr.  Stickney :— 


40 


At  one  time  on  that  field  a  question  was  asked,  "Where  is 
Warren?"  Where  was  he  not?  is  a  question  which  might  be 
asked  and  to  which  no  answer  can  be  given.  At  every  point  of 
the  battle  field,  at  the  precise  place  where  he  could  be  of  service,  at 
the  precise  time  when  he  could  be  of  service,  by  some  strange 
chance  he  was  at  hand.  Was  it  a  chance  ?  Or  is  it  the  fact  that 
one  man  on  that  field  had  a  keen  eye  to  seize  a  situation,  and  a 
keen  mind  to  devise  the  measures  to  meet  it?  Although  many  of 
the  witnesses  here  testify  that  they  did  not  see  their  own  division 
commanders  at  any  time  during  the  entire  day,  yet  so  it  is  that 
nearly  every  single  man  of  them  saw  Warren.  His  own  evidence 
as  to  his  movements  on  that  field  can  be  thrown  out  of  this  case, 
except  that  it  is  a  string  on  which  to  connect  the  events  given  us  by 
other  witnesses ;  and  we  could  get  his  movements  from  the  stories 
of  other  witnesses.  At  every  point  his  testimony  is  confirmed  by 
other  witnesses,  if  it  needed  confirmation. 

This  statement  of  the  case  is  also  supported  by 
the  argument  of  Major  Gardner,  counsel  for  General 
Sheridan,  who  (Record,  p.  1538)  attempts  to  make 
General  Warren's  undeniable  activity  the  basis  of  a 
charge  of  "great  indecision  in  his  movements." 

In  view  of  the  persistent  arraignment  of  General 
Warren  in  this  particular,  some  consideration  of 
General  Sheridan's  manner  and  method,  as  establish 
ed  before  the  court  of  inquiry,  is  certainly  admissible. 
In  his  evidence  (Record,  p.  94)  we  find  the  folio w- 
ing:- 

(,).  I  will  ask  \fou  the  question :  Had  you  at  that  time  any 
prejudice  against  General  Warren  ?  —  A.  No,  sir. 

Q.  His  reputation  was  that  of  an  efficient  officer,  was  it 
not?  —  A.  I  don't  know  what  his  reputation  was;  I  had  not 
served  with  him  especially. 

In  the  testimony  of  General  Chamberlain  (Rec 
ord,  p.  234)  we  find  a  strange  commentary  on  this  :— 

Q.    Were  you  at  the  head  of  the  column  ?  —  A.     I  was. 

Q.  About  what  hour  in  the  morning  was  it  when  you  met 
General  Sheridan?  — A.  I  think  it  was  seven  o'clock. 

Q.  What  was  the  conversation?  — A.  .  .  General  Sheridan 
asked  me  where  General  Warren  was.  I  told  him  I  understood 
him  to  be  at  the  rear  of  the  column  with  the  rear  division. 


41 


Q.  Give  the  whole  conversation,  the  words,  as  accurately  as 
you  can  ?  —  A.  The  general  made  a  reply  which  showed  that  he 
was  annoyed. 

Q.  I  want  the  words  ?  —  A.  He  said,  "That is  where  I  should 
expect  him  to  be",  or  words  to  that  effect. 

For  sake  of  brevity  we  quote  again  the  words  of 
Mr.  Stickney  (  Record,  pp.  1404—6  )  addressed  to  the 
court.  Says  Mr.  Stickney :  — 

Now,  the  most  singular  feature  of  this  whole  case,  the  most 
remarkable  point  in  it,  is  the  fact  that  a  -witness  comes  here  and 
says  :  "  Although  I  was  in  command  of  the  United  States  forces 
in  the  field  on  that  day,  I  saw  only  the  attack  of  General  Ayres 
on  that  earthwork  at  the  end;  I  know  nothing  of  Griffin's  move 
ments  ;  I  know  nothing  of  Crawford  7s  movements ;  1  do  not  know 
that  Crawford  became  engaged  with  Munford,  or  that  he  had  any 
fighting  at  any  point  in  the  woods  ;  I  do  not  know  any  thing  of 
what  the  commander  of  the  Fifth  Corps  did  during-  the  operations 
of  that  day ;  and  I  cannot  give"  —  for  those  are  his  words  —  "/ 
cannot  give  any  account  of  my  own  personal  movements  after 
Ayres's  assault.  Yet  I  have  had  the  glory  of  that  day  for  sixteen 
years.  And  I  still  claim  it !  " 

After  reference  to  pages  120-128  of  the  Record, 
in  substantiation,  he  continues  :  — 

If  ever  a  soldier  in  military  history  has  taken  such  a  position 
before,  it  is  beyond  my  knowledge.  If  any  enenn^  of  General 
Sheridan  should  tell  such  a  story  against  him  no  one  would  credit 
it;  but  it  is  the  statement  of  the  man  himself  as  to  his  own  move 
ments,  made  before  a  military  court.  And  there  we  must  leave 
him. 

We  find  further,  in  General  Sheridan's  testimony 
(Record,  pp.  100-1):- 

Q.  And  what  do  you  claim  was  Warren's  sin  of  omission  or 
commission  in  relation  to  that  going  off  to  the  right?  —  A.  If 
there  was  anybody  in  the  wide  w^orld  that  should  have  made  an 
effort  to  prevent  that,  General  Warren  was  the  man. 

Q.  Undoubtedly.  Now  do  you  know  whether  he  made  anv 
effort  or  not  ?  —  A.  I  don  '£  know.  I  did  not  realize  any. 

Q.  Did  you  ask  him  what  he  had  done?  —  A.  I  could  not 
find  him. 

Q-  Did  you  ask  him  afterwards  when  you  did  find  him  ? — A. 
No,  sir. 


42 

Q.    Did  you  ask  any  one  at  the  time  you  relieved  him  ?— A.    No, 
sir. 

Q.  Did  you  try  to  get  any  information  of  any  one  at  the 
time  you  relieved  him  ? — A.  No,  sir;  I  had  all  I  wanted. 

Turning  now  to  page  366  of  the  Record,  we  find 
the  testimony  of  General  Fred.  T.  Locke,  Assistant  Ad 
jutant-General  Fifth  Army  Corps,  as  to  his  interview 
with  General  Sheridan  on  the  White  Oak  Road  near 
Five  Forks,  while  General  Warren  was  pushing  for 
ward  with  his  troops  toward  the  Gilliam  field  and 
to  the  assault  of  the  last  lines  attempted  to  be  held 
by  the  enemy :  — 

Q.  Did  you  report  to  General  Sheridan  ?  —  A.  I  gave  him  the 
message  which  General  Warren  had  directed  me  to  give  him. 

Q.  Give  your  words  as  nearly  as  you  can.  — A.  That  we 
had  gained  the  enemy's  rear,  and  had  taken  over  1,500  prisoners, 
and  that  he  was  pushing  in  a  division  as  rapidly  as  he  could. 

Q.  Give  Sheridan's  answer.  — A.  General  Sheridan  turned 
around  on  his  horse,  he  raised  his  right  hand  in  this  manner,  and 
says:  "Tell  General  Warren,  by  G — /  I  say  he  was  not  at  the 
front.  That  is  all  I  have  got  to  say  to  him." 

Q.  Did  he  give  you  any  orders  or  instructions  for  General 
Warren  ? — A .  Not  a  word. 

Q.    What  was  his  manner  ?  — A.     Very  excited. 

General  Locke  wrote  in  his  note  book  the  words 
of  General  Sheridan's  reply  to  General  Warren's  mes 
sage,  and  confirmed  his  memorandum  by  reference 
to  Captain  Melcher  who  was  present  at  the  inter 
view.  Further  comment  on  General  Sheridan's  man 
ner  would  seem  to  be  unnecessar\r. 

One  other  point,  however,  should  be  briefly  no 
ted  in  the  words  of  Mr.  Stickney :  — 

General  Sheridan's  statement  is  that  this  resolution  to  relieve 
General  Warren  was  taken  by  him  after  the  battle  was  over 
[Memoirs.  Vol.  2,  p.  165],  in  view  of  the  new  conditions  that 
arose  at  the  end  of  the  engagement.  We  have  the  testimony  of 
Colonel  Brinton  [Record,  p.  303]  to  the  effect  that,  in  the  Sydnor 
field,  when  the  action  was  not  more  than  one  hour  in  progress, 
General  Sheridan  met  General  Griffin;  that  he  shouted  out  the 


question,  "Where  is  Warren?"  Without  waiting  for  an  answer, 
he  turned  to  General  Griffin  and  said  ,  "General  Griffin,  I  put  you 
in  command  of  the  Fifth  corps."  That  is  confirmed  by  General 
Chamberlain's  testimony  [Record,  pp.  277—8]  in  the  most  explicit 
manner. 

It  is  also  supported  by  General  Griffin's  official 
report  of  April  29,  1865. 

Space  allows  but  little  further  reference  to  Gener 
al  Sheridan's  Memoirs.  He  says  :  — 

Years  after  the  war,  in  1879,  a  Court  of  Inquiry  was  given 
General  Warren  in  relation  to  his  conduct  on  the  day  of  the  bat 
tle Briefly  stated,  in  my  report  of  the  battle  of  Five 

Forks  there  were  four  imputations  concerning  General  Warren. 
The  first  implied  that  Warren  failed  to  reach  me  on  the  1st  of 
April,  when  I  had  reason  to  expect  him;  the  second,  that  the 
tactical  handling  of  his  corps  was  unskilful;  the  third,  that  he 
did  not  exert  himself  to  get  his  corps  up  to  Gravelly  Run  Church  ; 
and  the  fourth,  that  when  portions  of  his  line  gave  way  he  did 
not  exert  himself  to  restore  confidence  to  his  troops.  The  court 
found  against  him  on  the  first  and  second  counts,  and  for  him  on 
the  third  and  fourth. 

He  concludes  his  remarks  with  the  assertion  that 
his  course  with  regard  to  General  Warren  is  plainly 
justifiable  in  the  view  of  all  who  are  disposed  to  be 
fair-minded,  and  quotes  from  General  Sherman's  re 
view  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Warren  Court,  words 
with  which  he  is  convinced  the  judgment  of  history 
will  accord. 

This  conclusion  calls  for  a  reference,  as  brief  as 
possible,  to  General  Warren's  repeated  applications 
for  redress,  and  the  results  that  followed. 

On  page  170  of  Benet's  Military  Law  and 
Courts-martial,  we  find  :  — 

The  articles  of  war  contain  full  authority  for  protecting  the 
rights  and  interests  of  inferiors,  by  giving  to  all  officers  and  sol 
diers  the  right  of  appeal,  and  requiring  superiors,  in  positive  and 
unequivocal  terms,  to  follow  certain  prescribed  modes  for  the 
doing  justice  to  the  appellant. 

And  again  on  page  176  :  — 


This  is  the  only  case —  the  redressing  of  wrongs  —  in  which  an 
appeal  can  he  made  to  a  higher  tribunal,  under  the  articles  of 
war;  thus  exhibiting  special  jealousy  for  the  rights  of  inferior 
officers  and  soldiers,  by  making  in  their  favor  a  marked  exception 
to  the  ordinary  course  of  military  trials. 

Following  the  letter  of  the  law,  the  aggrieved 
party  must  first  make  due  application  for  redress 
to  his  commanding  officer.  General  Warren  received 
the  order  of  General  Sheridan  relieving  him  from  the 
command  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps  and  directing  him 
to  report  to  General  Grant,  at  7  p.  m.  April  1,  1865. 
Before  leaving  the  field,  General  Warren  made  per 
sonal  application  to  General  Sheridan  for  a  reconsid 
eration  of  the  order.  On  the  testimony  of  General 
Sheridan's  own  aide  (Record  p.  1058)  that  officer's 
answer  was:  "Reconsider?  H — /  I  dorit  recon 
sider  my  determination"  This,  of  course,  relieved 
General  Warren  from  the  necessity  of  further  refer 
ence  to  General  Sheridan.  On  April  9,  1865,  how 
ever,  he  appealed  (Record,  pp.  13-17)  to  General 
Grant  for  a  court  of  inquiry.  General  Grant  re 
plied  :  "It  is  impossible  at  this  time  to  give  the  court 
and  witnesses  necessary  for  the  investigation." 
Early  in  1866,  General  Warren  again  urged  the  mat 
ter  upon  General  Grant's  attention,  through  the  per 
sonal  efforts  of  Senator  E.  D.  Morgan.  General 
Grant  again  declined  "  on  account  of  expenses  of 
court,  witnesses  etc."  On  May  1,  1866,  General 
Warren  made  application  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  but  without  result,  although  Mr. 
Stanton  at  first  promised  that  the  request  should  be 
granted.  Because  of  his  positive  decision  upon  the 
applications  already  made,  no  further  effort  was 
put  forth  during  the  presidency  of  General  Grant,  but 
on  November  18,  1879,  General  Warren  again  urged 
his  suit  through  the  Hon.  Geo.  W.  McCrary,  Secre- 


45 


tary  of  War.     This  application  was  endorsed  as  fol 

lows  :  — 

Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  D.  C.,  Dec.  2,  1879. 

The  Hon.  Secretary  of  War  having  asked  my  opinion  of  the 
enclosed  appeal,  I  must  say  that  the  long-endured  imputations  on 
the  fair  fame  of  General  Warren  warrants  the  court  of  inquiry  he 
has  repeatedly  asked  for,  and  which  has  thus  far  been  denied  him. 

W.  T.  Sherman, 

General. 

On  December  9,  1879,  the  order  convening  the 
court  was  issued  by  the  Adjutant-General. 

The  opinions  of  that  court,  as  finally  !aid  before 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  are  as  follows  :  — 


The  First  Imputation  is  found  in  an  extract  from  General 
Grant's  report,  on  page  1137  of  the  report  of  the  Honorable  Secre 
tary  of  War  to  the  first  session  of  the  Thirty-ninth  Congress,  as 
follows  (see,  also,  Record,  p.  48)  : 

"On  the  morning  of  the  31st,  General  Warren  reported  favor 
ably  to  getting  possession  of  the  White  Oak  Road,  and  was  direct 
ed  to  do  so.  To  accomplish  this,  he  moved  with  one  division  in 
stead  of  his  -whole  corps,  which  was  attacked  by  the  enemy  in 
superior  force  and  driven  back  on  the  second  division  before  it  had 
time  to  form,  and  it  in  turn  forced  back  upon  the  third  division; 
when  the  enemy  was  checked.  A  division  of  the  Second  Corps  was 
immediately  sent  to  his  support,  the  enemy  driven  back  with 
heavy  loss,  and  possession  of  the  White  Oak  Road  gained." 


OPINION. 

There  seems  to  be  no  evidence  that  General  Warren,  on  the 
morning  of  March  31,  or  at  any  other  time,  reported  favorably 
to  getting  possession  of  the  White  Oak  Road  except  in  his  des 
patch  (V)  of  4  p.  in.,  March  30,  already  referred  to,  and  the  move 
ment  suggested  in  that  was  practically  set  aside  by  General 
Grant's  despatch  (  YIII  )  of  March  30,  heretofore  quoted.  Gen 
eral  Warren's  report,  in  his  despatch  (  LXXXIV  )  of  9:40  a.  m., 
March  31,  quoted  above,  that  he  had  given  orders  to  drive  the 
enemy  's  pickets  off  the  White  Oak  Road  or  develop  what  force  of 
the  enemy  held  it,  could  not  be  fairly  construed  as  being  able  to 
take  possession  of  it. 


46 


With  regard  to  that  portion  of  the  imputation  contained  in 
the  statement  that  General  Warren  was  directed  to  take  possess 
ion  of  the  White  Oak  Road,  the  following  despatch  from  General 
Meade  is  the  only  one  that  can  bear  that  construction : 

"LXXXV. 
"U.  S.  M.  T. 
"Nuiian.  Hdqurs.  Armies  U.  S. 

"10:30  a.  m.,  Mar.  31,  1865. 
"To  Maj.  Gen.  G.  K.  Warren: 

"Your  despatch  giving  Ay  res 's  position  is  received.  Geii'l. 
Meade  directs  that  should  yon  determine  by  your  reconnoissahce 
that  voti  can  get  possession  of  and  hold  the  White  Oak  Road , 
you  are  to  do  so,  notwithstanding  the  orders  to  suspend  opera 
tions  to-day.  "Alex.  S.  Webb 

"Bv't.  M.  G.,  C.  of  S." 

And  the  evidence  before  the  court  shows  that  this  order  was 
not  received  by  General  Warren  till  after  the  fighting  that  resulted 
from  the  attempted  recomioissance  had  begun. 

It  is  in  evidence  by  Ayres  's  and  Crawford  's  testimony  that 
General  Warren  had  in  his  advance  two  divisions,  though  the 
testimony  does  not  clearly  show  how  long  before  the  attack  of 
the  enemy  upon  Ayres  the  division  of  Crawford  reached  him. 

Griffin 's  divison  was  held  in  reserve  along  the  branch  of 
Gravelly  Run  nearest  to  and  northwest  from  the  Boydton  Plank 
Road,  and  it  may  have  been  so  held  to  carry  out  the  intentions 
of  the  following-  despatch  from  General  Meade 's  headquarters : 

"LXXIX. 

"  Nunan.   8.32  a.  m.  U.  S.  M.  T. 

"Hclqrs.  A.  of  P.,  8.25,  Mar.  31,  1865. 
"To  Maj.  Gen.  Warren: 

"There  is  firing  along  Humphreys's  front.  The  Maj.  Gen'l 
com'd'g  desires  you  be  ready  to  send  your  reserve,  if  it  should  be 
called  for,  to  support  Humphreys. 

"There  will  be  no  movement  of  troops  to-day. 

"A.  S.  Webb, 
"Kec.  8.40  a.  m.— G.  K.  W."  "B.  M.  G." 

The  court  is  further  of  the  opinion  that,  considering  the  Fifth 
Corps  constituted  the  extreme  left  wing  of  the  armies  operating 
against  Richmond,  and  that  the  corps  was  in  a  delicate  position 
and  liable  to  be  attacked  at  any  moment,  of  which  liability  Gen 
eral  Warren  had  been  repeatedly  warned,  he  should  have  been 
with  his  advanced  divisions,  guiding  and  directing  them,  and  that 
he  should  have  started  earlier  to  the  front  than  he  did  and  not 
have  waited  at  the  telegraph  office  to  keep  in  communication  with 
General  Meade's  headquarters,  unless  he  had  direct  orders  that 


47 


morning  so  do  to,  which,   however,   does  not  appear  in  the  evi 
dence. 

SECOND  IMPUTATION. 

The  Second  Imputation  is  found  in  the  following  extract  from" 
General  Sheridan's  report  of  May  15,  1865  (See  Record,  pp.  21 
and  48),  as  folio ws: 

"  .  .  .  .  had  General  Warren  moved  according  to  the  ex 
pectations  of  the  Lieutenant-General,  there  would  appear  to  have 
been  but  little  chance  for  the  escape  of  the  enemy's  infantry  in 
front  of  the  Dinwiddie  Court  House." 


OPINION. 

It  is  supposed  that  "the  expectations  of  the  lieutenant-gener 
al,"  referred  to  in  this  imputation,  are  those  expressed  in  his  des 
patch  to  General  Sheridan  of  10.45  p.  m.  of  March  31,  1865,  as 
follows : 

"CLXXIX. 

"Dabney's  Mills, 
"March  31,  1865  —  10.45  p.  m. 
"Major-General  Sheridan: 

"The  5th  Corps  has  been  ordered  to  your  support.  Two  di 
visions  will  go  by  J.  Boisseau's  and  one  down  the  Boydton  Road. 
In  addition  to  this  I  have  sent  Mackenzie's  cavalry,  which  will 
reach  you  by  the  Vaughan  Road.  All  these  forces,  except  the  cav 
alry,  should  reach  you  by  12  to-night. 

You  will  assume  command  of  the  whole  force  sent  to  operate 
with  you  and  use  it  to  the  best  of  your  ability  to  destroy  the  force 
which  your  command  has  fought  so  gallantly  to-day. 

"U.  S.  Grant, 
' '  Lieutenant-  General . ' ' 

In  which  he  says,  "All  these  forces,  except  the  cavalnr,  should 
reach  you  by  12  to-night."  If  this  supposition  be  correct,  the  court 
is  of  opinion,  considering  the  condition  of  the  roads  and  surround 
ing  country  over  part  of  which  the  troops  had  to  march,  the 
darkness  of  the  night,  the  distance  to  be  traveled,  and  the  hour  at 
which  the  order  for  the  march  reached  General  Warren,  10.50  p. 
m.,  that  it  was  not  practicable  for  the  FifthCorps  to  havereachcd 
General  Sheridan  at  12  o'clock  on  the  night  of  March  31. 

Notwithstanding  that  dispositions  suitable  for  the  contin 
gency  of  Sheridan's  falling  back  from  Dinwiddie  might  well  have 
occupied  and  perplexed  General  Warren's  mind  during  the  night, 
the  court  is  of  the  opinion  that  he  should  have  moved  the  two  di 
visions  by  the  Crump  Road  in  obedience  to  the  orders  and  expec 
tations  of  his  commander,  upon  whom  alone  rested  the  responsi 
bility  of  the  consequences. 


48 


It  appears  from  the  despatches  and  General  Warren's  testi 
mony,  that  neither  Generals  Meade,  Sheridan,  or  Warren  expressed 
an  intention  of  having  this  column  attack  before  daylight. 

The  court  is  further  of  the  opinion  that  General  Warren 
should  have  started  with  two  divisions,  as  directed  by  General 
Meade's  despatch  (  CIV,  heretofore  quoted ),  as  early  after  its  re 
ceipt,  at  10,50  p.  m.,  as  he  could  be  assured  of  the  prospect  of  Ay- 
res's  departure  down  the  Boydton  Plank  Road,  and  should  have 
advanced  on  the  Crump  Road  as  far  as  directed  in  that  despatch, 
or  as  far  as  might  be  practicable  or  necessary  to  fulfill  General 
Meade's  intention ;  whereas  the  evidence  shows  that  he  did  not 
start  until  between  five  and  six  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  1st 
of  April,  and  did  not  reach  J.  Boisseau's  with  the  head  of  the 
column  until  about  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

The  despatches  show  that  Generals  Meade  and  Warren  anti 
cipated  a  withdrawal  during  the  night  of  the  enemy's  forces 
fronting  General  Sheridan,  which  was  rendered  highly  probable 
from  the  known  position  in  their  rear  of  a  portion  of  the  Fifth 
Corps  (  Bartlett's  Brigade  )  at  G.  Boisseau's,  and  the  event  justi 
fied  the  anticipation. 

THIRD  IMPUTATION. 

The  Third  Imputation  is  found  in  an  extract  from  General 
Sheridan's  report  of  May  16,  1865  (see  Record,  pages  21  and  48), 
as  follows : 

'  .  .  .  General  W^arren  did  not  exert  himself  to  get  up  his 
corps  as  rapidly  as  he  might  have  done,  and  his  manner  gave  me 
the  impression  that  he  wished  the  sun  to  go  down  before  disposi 
tions  for  the  attack  could  be  completed." 

On  the  afternoon  of  April  1,  the  Fifth  Corps  was  massed  as 
follows:  Crawford's  and  Griffin's  divisions  at  the  forks  of  the 
Crump  Road  and  the  main  road  from  Diiiwiddie  Court  House  to 
Five  Forks,  and  Ayres's  division  on  the  Brooke's  Road  about  one- 
fourth  of  a  mile  east  from  the  forks  of  that  road  and  the  road  to 
Five  Forks. 

The  distance  from  the  position  of  Griffin  and  Crawford  to  the 
place  of  formation  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  near  Gravelly  Run  Church, 
was  about  21/4  miles,  and  the  length  of  the  corps  when  spread  out 
in  column  of  route  would  be  about  2%  miles.  The  last  file  of  the 
column  required  as  much  time  to  reach  the  place  of  formation  as 
it  would  have  taken  to  march  about  5  miles. 

General  Warren  received  his  orders  near  Gravelly  Run  Church 
to  move  up  his  corps  at  1  p.  m.,  and  it  took  some  time  to  com 
municate  those  orders  to  the  divisions  and  for  the  movement  to 
begin. 

The  route  to  the  place  of  formation   was   along  a  narrow 


49 


road,  very  muddy  and  slippery,  somewhat  encumbered  with  wag 
ons  and  led  horses  of  the  cavalry  corps,  and  the  men  were  fa 
tigued.  The  testimony  of  brigade  and  division  commanders  is  to 
the  effect  that  the  corps  in  line  of  march*  was  well  closed  up,  and 
that  no  unnecessary  delay  was  incurred. 

The  corps  reached  its  destination,  and  was  formed  ready  to 
advance  against  the  enemy  about  4  p.  m. 

It  is  in  evidence  that  General  Warren  remained  near  Gravelly 
Run  Church,  directing  the  formation,  explaining  the  mode  of  at 
tack  to  the  division  and  brigade  commanders,  with  sketches  pre 
pared  for  the  purpose. 

General  Warren  also  repeatedly  sent  out  staff  officers  to  the 
division  commanders  in  order  to  expedite  the  march. 

OPINION. 

The  court  is  of  the  opinion  that  there  was  no  unnecessary  de 
lay  in  this  march  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  that  General  Warren 
took  the  usual  methods  of  a  corps  commander  to  prevent  delay. 

The  question  regarding  General  Warren's  manner  appears  to 
be  too  intangible  and  the  evidence  on  it  too  contradictory  for  the 
court  to  decide,  separate  from  the  context,  that  he  appeared  to 
wish  "the  sun  to  go  down  before  dispositions  for  the  attack 
would  be  completed  ;  "  hut  his  actions,  as  shown  by  the  evidence, 
do  not  appear  to  have  corresponded  with  such  wish,  if  ever  he 
entertained  it. 

FOURTH  IMPUTATION. 

The  Fourth  Imputation  is  found  in  an  extract  from  General 
Sheridan's  report  of  May  16,  1865  (see  Record,  pp.  22  and  48  ), 
as  follows: 

"  During  this  attack  I  again  became  dissatisfied  with  General 
Warren.  During  the  engagement  portions  of  his  line  gave  way 
when  not  exposed  to  a  heavy  fire,  and  simply  from  want  of  confi 
dence  on  the  part  of  the  troops,  which  General  Warren  did  not 
exert  himself  to  inspire." 

When  the  Fifth  Corps  moved  up  to  the  attack,  General  Sher 
idan  said  to  General  Ayres,  "  I  will  ride  with  you."  General  War 
ren  was  on  the  left  of  Crawford's  division,  between  Crawford  and 
Ayres. 

When  General  Ay  res 's  command  struck  the  White  Oak  Road 
it  received  a  fire  in  flank  from  the  enemy's  "return"  nearly  at 
right  angles  to  the  road.  He  changed  front  immediately  at  right 
angles  and  faced  the  "return,"  his  right  receiving  a  fire  from  Mun- 


50 


ford 's  Confederate  division  of  dismounted  cavalry  distributed 
along  the  edge  of  the  woods  to  the  north  of  the  White  Oak  Road. 
There  was  some  confusion,  which  was  immediately  checked  by  the 
exertions  of  General  Sheridan,  General  Ayres,  and  other  officers. 

The  evidence  shows  that  General  Warren  was  observant  of 
Ayres,  because  he  sent  orders  to  Winthrop's  reserve  brigade  to 
form  on  the  left  of  Ayres's  new  line. 

This  necessary  change  of  front  of  Ayres  increased  the  in 
terval  between  him  and  Crawford  on  his  right;  the  latter  was 
marching  without  change  of  direction  until,  as  he  expressed  it, 
he  would  clear  the  right  of  Ayres,  when  he  was  also  to  change 
front  to  the  left. 

At  this  moment,  Warren,  who  saw  that  Crawford,  with 
Griffin  following,  was  disappearing  in  the  woods  to  the  north  of 
the  White  Oak  Road,  sent  a  staff  officer  to  Griffin  to  come  as 
quickly  as  he  could  to  sustain  Ayres ;  went  himself  to  the  left  brig 
ade  of  Crawford,  and  caused  a  line  to  be  marked  out  facing  to 
the  west,  directing  the  brigade  commander  to  form  on  it ;  then 
went  into  the  woods  and  gave  orders  to  the  right  brigade  of 
Crawford  to  form  on  the  same  line.  When  he  returned  to  the 
open  ground  the  brigade  he  had  directed  to  change  front  had  dis 
appeared,  as  appears  by  the  evidence,  in  consequence  of  orders 
given  by  an  officer  of  General  Sheridan1  s  staff.  General  Warren 
sent  repeated  orders  by  staff-officers  to  both  Griffin  and  Craw 
ford  to  change  direction,  and  went  himself  to  both,  and  finally  by 
these  means  corrected,  as  far  as  was  possible  under  the  circum 
stances,  the  divergence  of  these  two  divisions. 

It  appears  from  evidence  that  these  two  divisions  were  oper 
ating  in  the  woods  and  over  a  difficult  country,  and  received  a 
fire  in  their  front  from  the  dismounted  cavair}'  of  Munford, 
posted  in  the  woods  to  the  north  of  the  White  Oak  Road,  which 
led  to  the  belief  for  some  time,  that  the  enemy  had  a  line  of  battle 
in  front ;  and  this  may  furnish  one  reason  why  it  was  so  difficult 
at  first  to  change  their  direction  to  the  proper  one. 

OPINION. 

General  Warren's  attention  appears  to  have  been  drawn,  al 
most  immediately  after  Ayres  received  the  flank  fire  from  the  "re 
turn"  and  his  consequent  change  of  front,  to  the  probability  of 
Crawford  with  Griffin  diverging  too  much  from  and  being  sepa- 
,  rated  from  Ayres,  and  by  continuous  exertions  of  himself  and  staff 
substantially  remedied  matters;  and  the  court  thinks  that  this 
was  for  him  the  essential  point  to  be  attended  to,  which  also  ex 
acted  his  whole  efforts  to  accomplish. 


51 

When  the  delicacy  of  the  position  in  which  the 
court  —  consisting  of  but  two  members,  who  must 
concur  —  was  placed  by  the  necessity  of  expressing 
judicial  opinions  upon  the  statements  of  Generals 
Grant  and  Sheridan,  is  taken  into  consideration, 
nothing  can  be  more  explicit  than  those  opinions  as 
here  given.  It  would  be  impossible  to  pronounce 
against  the  allegations  of  those  officers  in  clearer  or 
more  courteous  language.  Concerning  the  criticisms 
of  General  Warren's  personal  movements  on  March 
31,  and  the  movements  of  his  divisions  on  the  earlv 
morning  of  April  1,  it  is  manifest  from  the  opinions 
as  expressed,  and  from  details  given  in  the  reports, 
that  the  court,  conscious  that  the  death  of  General 
Meade  had  deprived  General  Warren  of  a  most  ma 
terial  witness,  and  fully  recognizing  the  embarrass 
ments  under  which  he  had  been  called  to  act,  simply 
differed  from  General  Warren  in  the  conclusions  he 
arrived  at,  and  acted  upon,  in  the  discharge  of  his 
duty  as  corps  commander  during  the  absence  of  his 
superior  from  the  front  and  that  superior's  conse 
quent  lack  of  full  information  as  to  the  developing 
details  of  the  field.  General  Humphreys  (Va.  Cahi- 
paign.  p.  341  )  has  said  :  — 

But  General  Warren  should  have  moved  with  Griffin  and 
Crawford  as  soon  as  practicable  after  receiving  Meade's  order  at 
10.50  p.  m.,  though  it  \vill  be  observed  that  subsequent  to  that 
hour  General  Meade  subordinated  all  General  Warren's  efforts  to 
ensuring  the  presence  of  one  of  his  divisions  with  General  Sher 
idan  by  daylight. 

There  is,  in  neither  case,  any  imputation  cast 
upon  General  Warren's  motives,  efforts,  or  intelli 
gence,  but  simply  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  prac 
ticability  and  the  necessities  of  the  case.  It  is  mani 
fest  that,  while  the  death  of  General  Meade  rendered 
it  impossible  for  General  Warren  to  present  direct 


52 

and  positive  evidence '  that  his  actions  upon  March 
31,  and  the  night  following,  had  been  such  as  to 
satisfy  the  intentions  and  requirements  of  his  su 
perior  and  commanding  officer,  the  facts,  as  es 
tablished  to  the  satisfaction  of,  and  as  stated  by 
the  court,  and  as  indicated  by  General  Humph 
reys,  all  strongly  support  that  hypothesis  against 
which  no  evidence  stronger  than  mere  specula 
tion  has  been  produced,  and  General  Alex.  S.  Webb, 
the  last  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac —  a  witness  of  unquestionable  competence  and, 
on  this  point,  second  in  authority  only  to  General 
Meade  himself — states  positively  to  the  writer:  "I 
believe  General  Meade  was  satisfied  with  General 
Warren's  movements  March  31,  to  April  1.  We  who 
knew  Warren  felt  that  he  would  do  his  best  to  re 
lieve  Sheridan." 

The  record  of  the  proceedings  of  the  court  was 
submitted  to  the  Honorable  Robert  T.  Lincoln,  Sec 
retary  of  War,  accompanied  by  a  report  from  Briga 
dier-General  D.  G.  Swaim,  Judge-Advocate  General, 
U.  S.  Army,  under  date  of  July  11,  1882.  That  re 
port  is  notoriously  something  far  other  than  a  legiti- 

i.  General  Meade's  despatch  to  General  Grant  dated  6  a.  m.,  April  i,  1865 
(Record,  p.  1254),  concludes  with  the  words,  "Warren  will  be  at  or  near  Dinwiddie 
soon,  with  his  whole  corps,  and  will  require  further  orders."  The  following  despatch 
(Record,  p.  1288)  was  received  by  Gensral  Warren  about  g  a.  JH.  April  i: 

"  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

"  April  i,  6  a.  m.,  1864. 
"  Maj.  Gen.  Warren  : 

"Gen'l  Meade  directs  that  in  the  movements  following  your  junction  with  Gen'l 
Sheridan  you  will  be  uuder  his  orders,  and  will  report  to  him.  Please  send  a  report  of 
progress. 

"Alex.  S.    Webb, 

"  R  M.  G,,  C.  O.  S." 

In  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  these  despatches  certainly  indicate 
that  General  Warren  —  held  under  direct  orders  from  General  Meade  up  to  b  a.  in. 
April  i — had  met  the  intentions  and  expectations  of  his  commanding  officer,  and 
had  even  exceeded,  or  anticipated,  them  when  his  whole  corps  had  joined  and  report 
ed  to  General  Sheridan  before  7  a.  m.  — two  hours  before  the  receipt  of  the  6  a.  nr 
order  sent  by  General  Webb. 


53 


mate  and  legal  review  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
court.  It  is,  in  fact,  an  arbitrary  re-trial  of  the  case 
by  the  Judge-Advocate  General  in  which  General  D. 
G.  Swaim  assumes  to  set  aside  and  modify  the  find 
ings  and  opinions  of  Generals  C.  C.  Augur  and  John 
Newton. 

This  brings  us  to  the  report  of  General  Sherman, 
so  confidently  referred  to  by  General  Sheridan.  After 
reciting  a  brief  history  of  the  case  as  it  seems  to  ap 
pear  to  him,  General  Sherman  states  that  General 
Sheridan's  action  in  relieving  General  Warren  was 
sustained  by  General  Grant  and  never  questioned  by 
either  President  Lincoln  or  President  Johnson  and 
that,  "  There  the  matter  ought  to  have  ended." 
General  Sherman,  however,  could  not  but  be  aware 
that  the  action  of  Generals  Grant  and  Sheridan  has 
never  yet  received  the  presidential  approval  which 
alone  could  make  it  defensible  and  legal,  and  he 
neglects  to  state  how  it  came  that  the  matter  was 
not  brought  to  the  attention  ol  Presidents  Lincoln  or 
Johnson ;  and,  further,  the  Articles  of  War,  and  his 
own  endorsement  upon  General  Warren's  last,  and 
successful,  application  for  a  court,  do  not  sustain  the 
reconsidered  opinion  he  here  expresses  —  on  the  report 
of  the  court  becoming  known.  General  Sherman 
states  that  the  findings  of  the  court  "confirm  sub 
stantially  what  was  officially  reported  on  the  dates 
of  the  occurrences,"  but  this,  and  his  preceding  de 
tailed  statements  to  the  same  effect,  are  clearly  de 
nied  by  the  court  itself. 

General  Sherman  affirms  "the  patriotism,  integ 
rity,  and  great  intelligence  of  General  Warren,"  as 
"attested  by  a  long  record  of  most  excellent  service," 
but,  with  warning  of  dire  results  in  future  wars  if 
General  Sheridan  is  not  "fullv  and  entirelv  sustain- 


54 


ed,"  he  endorses  General  Sheridan  in  a  course  that 
can  be  justified  only  on  the  assumption  that  General 
Warren  was  lacking  in  every  trait  conceded  and, 
also,  was  what  General  Sheridan's  counsel  essayed 
to  prove  him  —  a  scheming  coward. 
General  Sherman  says  :  — 

It  would  be  an  unsafe  and  dangerous  rule  to  hold  the  com 
mander  of  an  army  in  battle  to  a  technical  adherance  to  any  rule 
of  conduct  for  managing  his  command.  He  is  responsible  for  re 
sults  and  holds  the  lives  and  reputatio-ns  of  every  officer  and  sol 
dier  under  his  orders  as  subordinate  to  the  great  end  —  victory. 

To  understand  that  neither  General  Grant,  nor 
General  Sherman,  nor  General  Sheridan  believed  this 
monstrous  theory,  one  has  but  to  recall  their  own 
words  concerning  Shiloh,  Corinth,  Raleigh  and 
Todd's  Tavern.  The  roar  of  battle  absolves  no  offi 
cer,  from  the  commander-in-chief  down,  from  obe 
dience  to  the  Constitution  and  to  the  Articles  of 
War ;  nor  does  it  release  him  from  the  obligations  of 
honor  and  justice  in  his  own  person ;  still  less  does 
it  place  the  reputation  of  any  subordinate  at  his  dis 
posal  ,  and  to  persist  in  wrong  under  such  a  plea  is 
base.  If  the  able  argument  made  by  General  War 
ren's  counsel  before  the  court  of  inquiry  needed  sup 
port,  or  confirmation,  where  could  they  be  better 
found  than  in  this  quaint  appeal  unto  Caesarism,  — 
this  plea  in  confession  and  avoidance  —  upon  which 
General  Sheridan  has  rested  his  case  ? 

The  final  endorsement  upon  the  proceedings  of 
the  court  of  inquiry  is  as  follows  :  — 

War  Department, 

November  21,  1882. 

The  foregoing  proceedings  and  report  having  been  laid  before 
the  President,  he  directs  that  the  findings  and  opinions  of  the 
court  of  inquiry  be  published. 

Robert  T.  Lincoln, 

Secretary  of  War. 


55 


In  professed  compliance  with  that  endorsement, 
a  limited  number  of  copies  of  the  full  proceedings  and 
report  of  the  court  were  printed  and  to  a  very  lim 
ited  extent  were  distributed.  At  the  same  time,  how 
ever,  a  pamphlet  containing  the  report  and  opinion 
of  the  court,  together  with  the  reports  of  the  Judge- 
Advocate  General  and  the  General  of  the  Army,  was 
largely  printed  and  widely  distributed.  And  yet,  we 
are  told  that  military  law  and  military  courts  are 
established  for  the  purpose  of  "arriving  at  the  truth, 
that  there  may  not  in  any  case,  be  a  failure  of  jus 
tice"  ! 


FIVE  FORKS 

TO 

APPOMATTOX  COURT  HOUSE. 


General  Grant  (Mem.  Vol.2,  p.  216)  describes 
General  Warren  as  "  a  gallant  soldier,  an  able  man  ; 
and  he  was  besides  thoroughly  imbued  with  the  so 
lemnity  and  importance  of  the  duty  he  had  to  per 
form" .  Afterwards,  referring  (p.  445)  to  the  re 
moval  of  General  Warren  from  the  command  of  the 
Fifth  Army  Corps,  he  says  :  — 

"I  was  so  much  dissatisfied  with  Warren's  dilatory  move 
ments  in  the  battle  of  White  Oak  Road  and  in  his  failure  to  reach 
Sheridan  in  time,  that  I  was  very  much  afraid  that  at  the  last  mo 
ment  he  would  fail  Sheridan.  He  was  a  man  of  fine  intelligence, 
great  earnestness,  quick  perception,  and  could  make  his  disposi 
tions  as  quicklv  as  auv  officer,  under  difficulties  where  he  was 
forced  to  act.  But  I  had  before  discovered  a  defect  which  was  be 
yond  his  control,  that  was  very  prejudicial  to  his  usefulness  in 
emergencies  like  the  one  just  before  us.  He  could  see  every  danger 
at  a  glance  before  he  had  encountered  it.  He  would  not  only  make 
preparations  to  meet  the  danger  which  might  occur,  but  he  would 
intorm  his  commanding  officer  what  others  should  do  while  he 
was  executing  his  move. 

I  had  sent  a  staff  officer  to  General  Sheridan  to  call  his  atten 
tion  to  these  defects,  and  to  say  that  as  much  as  I  liked  General 
Warren,  now  was  not  a  time  when  we  could  let  our  personal  feel 
ings  for  any  one  stand  in  the  way  of  success ;  and  if  his  removal 
was  necessary  to  success,  not  to  hesitate.  It  was  upon  that  au- 


57 


thorization  that  Sheridan  removed  Warren.  I  was  very  sorry 
that  it  had  been  done,  and  regretted  still  more  that  I  had  not 
long  before  taken  occasion  to  assign  him  to  another  field  of  duty. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  upon  General  Grant's 
expression  of  regret  that  he  had  not  sooner  removed 
General  Warren  from  the  field  where  he  had  won  his 
corps  command,  or  to  call  attention  to  his  sorrow 
over  the  adoption  of  his  own  suggestion.  It  is  wor 
thy  of  notice,  however,  that,  when  testifying  under 
oath  before  the  Warren  Court  of  Inquiry,  General 
Grant  stated  positively  (Record,  pp.  1028-1034) 
that  his  reasons  for  sending  the  authorization  for  re 
moval  to  General  Sheridan  did  not  have  reference  to 
General  Warren's  conduct  on  March  31,  or  April  1, 
1865,  but  "  to  previous  conduct  "  While  the  sworn 
evidence  thus  emphatically  denies  the  correctness  of 
the  later  statement  as  to  that  point,  it  is  evident 
that  all  recollection  of  the  witness-stand  had  not  es 
caped  the  writer  of  the  Memoirs,  for  in  his  testimony 
we  find  (  Record  p.  1041)  the  interjected  implication  : 

But  where  officers  undertook  to  think  for  themselves,  and 
considered  that  the  officer  giving  them  orders  had  not  fully  con 
sidered  what  everybody  else  was  to  do,  it  generally  led  to  failure 
or  delay. 

In  consideration  of  the  opinions  expressed  by  the 
court  of  inquiry  upon  the  allegations  made  against 
General  Warren  by  Generals  Grant  and  Sheridan ; 
and  in  view  of  the  facts,  well  established  by  the  rec 
ord  of  that  court,  that  General  Warren  not  only  saw 
the  dangers  encountered  by  his  command  on  March 
31,  and  April  1,  1865,  but  successfully  met  and  over 
came  them,  and,  in  addition,  of  his  own  soldierly  vo 
lition  made  such  dispositions  as  materially  aided 
General  Sheridan  to  maintain  himself  under  the  re 
verse  he  encountered  upon  March  31, — the  record 
of  General  Warren  mav  safelv  be  left  to  maintain 


58 


his  honor  and  ability  against  indefinite  insinuations 
as  "to  previous  conduct."  Had  that  record  not 
been  practically  unassailable,  General  Warren  could 
not  have  maintained  the  command  he  held  from 
May  4,  1864,  to  April  1,  1865.  To  this  the  Mili 
tary  History  and  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant 
bear  witness,  and  the  time  and  method  of  his  re 
moval  from  that  command  emphasize  the  involun 
tary  testimony. 

Constituted,  as  it  was,  solely  for  the  consider 
ation  of  General  Warren's  conduct,  the  investigation 
of  the  Warren  Court  of  Inquiry  was  made  upon  the 
assumption,  repeatedly  stated  and  assented  to  by 
counsel  for  General  Warren,  that  the  appropriate 
ness  of  the  action  of  Generals  Grant  and  Sheridan, 
and  the  sufficiency  of  their  authority,  were  not  to  be 
questioned.  That,  as  a  matter  of  absolute  fact,  the 
assumption  was  at  least  debatable,  is  very  clearly 
indicated  by  General  Sherman's  report  and  pleading 
upon  the  proceedings  of  the  court.  That  the  course 
pursued  by  the  Lieutenant-General  and  the  com 
mander  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  "  does  not 
occur  frequently,"  is  acknowledged  by  the  evidence 
(  Record,  p.  93  )  of  General  Sheridan. 

The  army  exists  by  authority  of  the  Constitu 
tion  of  the  United  States.  Under  that  authority, 
the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate,  appoints  and  commissions  all  commis 
sioned  officers  of  the  army.  The  resignation  of  offi 
cers  appointed  by  the  President  can  be  accepted  by 
him  alone,  and,  except  in  time  of  war,  no  officer  can 
be  dismissed  from  the  army  except  by  sentence  of 
court-martial  approved  by  the  President ;  and  with 
out  his  approval  no  sentence  of  a  court-martial 
which  affects  a  general  officer  is  effective  in  time  of 


59 

either  peace  or  war.  The  transfer  of  officers  from 
one  regiment  or  corps  to  another  can  be  made  only 
by  authority  of  the  President,  and  "if,  upon  marches, 
guards,  or  in  quarters,  different  corps  of  the  same 
army  shall  happen  to  join,  or  do  duty  together,  the 
officer  highest  in  rank  .  ,  .  there  on  duty  or  in 
quarters,  shall  command  the  whole,  .  .  .  unless 
otherwise  specially  directed  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  case." 
These  powers,  conferred  by  the  Constitution  upon 
the  President  alone,  relate  to  the  course  of  ordinary 
military  proceedings.  For  special  reasons  and  pecu 
liar  emergencies,  still  greater  powers  are  entrusted 
to  him  —  and  to  him  alone.  By  Act  of  Congress, 
July  17,  1862,  the  President  of  the  United  States 
was  "authorized  and  requested  to  dismiss  and  dis 
charge  from  military  service  either  in  the  army, 
navy,  marine  corps,  or  volunteer  force,  in  the  United 
States  service,  any  officer  for  any  cause  which,  in  his 
judgment,  either  renders  such  officer  unsuitable  for, 
or  whose  dismission  would  promote,  the  public  ser 
vice,"  and  in  any  time  of  war,  to  him  alone,  as  Com 
mander-in-chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United 
States,  belongs  the  right  and  duty  of  assigning  com 
manders  to  Army  Corps,  or  Armies,  in  the  field,  and 
of  removing  them  for  cause  sufficient  in  his  judg 
ment;  hut  neither  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  nor  the  Articles  of  War,  contain  any  author 
ity  for  the  delegation  of  any  of  these  powers  espe 
cially  entrusted  to  the  President  to  any  other  officer 
of  the  government.  That  there  are  grave  reasons 
why  such  power  should  be  thus  limited  and  guarded, 
scarce  needs  an  argument.  Commenting  upon  the 
subject  of  dismissals  from  the  service  "by  order  of 
the  President,"  an  undoubted  authority  (Benet. 
Military  Law  and  Courts-martial)  says:  — 


60 

Much  might  be  said  on  the  ground  of  expediency,  in  opposi 
tion  to  the  rule  and  practice  in  this  regard,  but  we  will  only  re 
mark,  that  the  power  of  the  President  to  remove  officers  from  the 
army  at  his  pleasure,  might  some  day  prove  of  greater  danger  to 
the  liberties  of  the  people,  than  the  simple  fact  of  keeping  up  a 
standing  army.  The  right  of  appointing  to  office  during  the  re 
cess  of  the  Senate,  said  appointments  to  hold  until  the  end  of  the 
next  session  of  Congress,  gives  to  an  unscrupulous  executive  a 
fearful  power.  The  selection  of  political  tools,  to  hold  such  posi 
tions  for  many  months,  would  suffice,  under  circumstances  of 
great  extremity,  to  work  out  direst  evils  to  the  republic.  Such  a 
power  over  an  army  cannot  be  too  well  guarded  by  all  the  checks 
which  an  enlightened  jndgment  can  impose,  and  as  an  evil,  is  more 
to  be  dreaded  than  the  perpetual  tenure  of  officers'  commissions, 
subject  as  they  are  to  the  close  supervision  of  military  tribunals. 

To  exercise  by  proxy  the  powers  entrusted  solely 
to  the  President,  would  extend,  rather  than  guard 
against,  the  evil  indicated,  and  concerning  a  dele 
gated  authority  to  remove  regularly  assigned  com- 
manders'in  the  field,  another  high  authority  conden 
ses  the  same  reasoning  into  :  — 

Given  a  general-in-chief — sa3'  Arnold  who  turned  traitor  — 
he  can  remove  every  corps  or  division  commander,  replace  them 
with  tools,  and  make  treason  a  success. 

General  Warren  had  for  years  honored  a  commis 
sion  in  the  army.  Not  even  his  traducers  have  de 
nied  that  his  service  —  in  peace  and  war  —  as  subord 
inate  or  when  in  high  command  —  was  pre-eminently 
distinguished  by  zeal,  fidelity,  thoroughness,  and  in 
telligence  that  neither  fear  nor  favor  could  swerve 
from  the  line  of  truth  and  duty.  In  addition,  history 
will  record  that  the  facts  established  by  sworn  testi 
mony  before  the  court  of  inquiry,  sustain  the  state 
ment  that  his  only  error  as  commander  of  the  Fifth 
Army  Corps  at  Five  Forks  lay  in  obeying  General 
Sheridan's  order  relieving  him  from  his  command, 
and  that  even  that  error  is  not  only  palliated  by  the 
participation  of  his  comrades,  but  heightens  his  re 
nown —  for  it  illustrates  the  devoted  subordination 


61 


so  characteristic  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which 
will  stand  forever  in  refutation  of  puerile  charges  of 
jealousy. 

The  following  order  is  still  on  the  files  of  the  War 
Department,  and  unrevoked  :  — 

Order  \  Adjutant-General's  Offiee, 

No-  54J  Washington,  13th  August,  1829- 

The  subjoined  Regulation,  approved  by  the  President  of  the 

United  States,  has  been  received  from  the  War  Department,  and 

is  published  for  the  information  and  government  of  all  concerned. 

"REGULATION  CONCERNING  RANK  AND  COMMAND. 

"6.  An  officer  entrusted  with  the  command  of  a  post,  detach 
ment,  guard,  or  separate  command,  will  not  surrender  it  to  ano 
ther,  unless  regularly  relieved  from  the  duty  assigned  him,  except 
in  case  of  sickness  or  inability  to  perform  his  duty,  wben  the  offi 
cer  next  in  rank,  present  and  on  duty  with  such  command,  will 
succeed  as  a  matter  of  course. 

"  By  command  of  the  President : 

"John  F.  Eaton, 

"Secretary  of  War. 
"  By  Order  of  Alexander  Macomb, 

"  Major-General  Commanding  the  Army  : 


"Adjutant  General." 

This  order  appears  as  paragraph  15  of  General 
Regulations  of  1841,  and  was  repeated  in  General 
Order  No.  5,  March  12,  1846.  It  does  not  appear  in 
set  terms,  however,  in  the  succeeding  Army  Regula 
tions,  probably  because  it  announces  an  axiomatic 
principle  underlying  the  whole  military  system  — 
that  no  one  can  resign  a  trust  confided  to  him  unless 
regularly  relieved  by  competent  authority.  General 
Warren,  therefore,  should  have  demanded  to  see  in 
writing  the  authority  under  which  General  Sheridan 
assumed  to  act,  and  competent  authority  not  being 
thus  presented,  he,  in  loyal  subordination  to  the  su- 


62 


per  lor  from  \vhom  he  derived  his  own  authority  and 
had  received  his  trust,  should  have  declined  to  sur 
render  his  command.  The  command  of  an  army,  or 
army  corps,  is  no  ordinary  charge.  Commanders 
assigned  to  such  positions  by  the  President,  or  sover 
eign  power,  are  presumed  to  possess  additional  quali 
ties  over  and  above  the  mere  acquirement  of  techni 
calities,  or  simple  personal  gallantry,  and  only  the 
power  conferring  can  relieve  from  the  grave  responsi 
bilities  of  such  a  trust.  Possibly,  to  meet  great  em 
ergencies,  the  President  might  grant  to  a  general-in- 
chief,  the  right  to  remove  or  replace  a  corps  com 
mander,  subject  to  report  without  delay  for  his  con 
firmation  or  disapproval,  but  there  can  be  no  au 
thority,  or  right,  involved  to  delegate  the  power  still 
further, —  least  of  all,  to  one  holding  equal  rank  as 
corps  commander,  and  by  verbal  authorization  so 
vague  and  general  that  neither  the  author  nor  the 
recipient  (Record,  pp.  55,  93,  901,  1028)  retain  a 
definite  recollection  of  the  form. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  General  Sherman's 
plea  for  relief  from  the  restraints  of  "any  rule  of  con 
duct"  was  somewhat  urgently  needed  in  the  attempt 
to  sustain  the  assumption  of  presidential  authority 
shown  by  the  removal  of  General  Warren  and  the 
assignment  of  General  Griffin  to  the  corps  command 
over  General  Crawford,  a  senior  division  com 
mander  present  and  on  duty  with  the  corps.  The 
supposition  that  any  emergency  called  for  such  an 
exercise  of  illegal  power  cannot  be  maintained.  Le 
gitimate  means  were  available,  and  ample  for  all 
necessities.  If  General  Sheridan  was  satisfied  that 
General  Warren  had  in  any  way  failed  in  his  duty  on 
April  1,  1865,  he  had  it  rightfully  in  his  power,  as 
commanding  officer,  to  order  General  Warren  to  re- 


63 


port  in  arrest  to  his  army  commander,  General 
Meade.  In  that  event,  however,  General  Warren 
could  not  have  been  denied  an  immediate  hearing  he- 
fore  a  tribunal  of  his  peers. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  comment  on  the  gratu 
itous  discourtesy  to  the  commander  of  the  Army  of 

^  •/ 

the  Potomac,  involved  in  the  method  adopted. 

General  Grant  has  gravely  recorded  that  General 
Warren's  intelligence,  activity,  and  prevision,  in  con 
nection  with  his  subordination  in  carefully  reporting 
to  his  superiors  the  developments  of  the  field  as  they 
presented  themselves  and  his  judgment  as  to  the 
means  that  best  could  meet  those  developments, 
were  "very  prejudical  to  his  usefulness  in  emergen 
cies."  The  acknowledged  intelligence  of  General 
Grant  precludes  the  possibility  of  accepting  as  sin 
cere —  save  as  an  involuntary  confession  of  incorrigi 
ble  prejudice  —  the  suggestion,  thus  made,  that  the 
very  qualities  pre-eminently  requisite  in  a  corps  com 
mander  could  be  prejudicial  to  his  usefulness  when 
guided  by  an  earnest  loyalty  such  as  all  accord  to 
General  Warren.  That  General  Grant  himself,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  attached  but  little  importance  to  the 
charges  he  insinuates  against  General  Warren  —  save 
as  they  might  affect  the  credulous  public  mind  —  is 
fully  evidenced,  not  only  by  his  intelligence,  but  also 
by  his  Military  History  and  Personal  Memoirs 
aided  by  the  Personal  Memoirs  of  P.  H.  Sheridan. 
The  last  named  work  has  certainly  made  clear  the 
fact,  indicated  on  the  pages  of  the  preceding  works, 
that,  in  General  Sheridan's  case  when  in  command 
of  the  Cavalry  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
from  May  4,  to  May  7,  1864,  General  Grant  not 
only  sUvStained,  but  even  rewarded,  that  officer  for 


64 


exercising  the  right  of  thinking  for  himself  and  of  re 
flecting  upon  his  commander  to  an  extent  that  even 
a  moderate  rendering  of  military  law  and  ethics  can 
class  only  as  closely  bordering  upon  open  mutiny. 
Again  —  on  pages  436-7  of  his  second  volume,  Gen 
eral  Grant  relates  the  dissatisfaction  of  General 
Sheridan  at  the  order  he  (  General  Grant )  had  issued 
for  the  movements  of  March  29,  1865,  because  he 
believed  himself  to  be  therein  ordered  "to  cut  loose 
again  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac"  (the  very  or 
der  to  secure  which  he  had  revolted  against  the  com 
mand  of  General  Meade  ten  months  before),  and 
that  he  ( General  Grant )  followed  and,  in  a  private 
conversation,  pacified  his  discontented  subordinate 
by  confidential  explanations. 

General  Sheridan  now  makes  the  point  even 
clearer  still.  On  pages  112  and  113  of  his  second 
volume,  referring  to  his  Shenandoah  Valley  campaign 
of  February,  1865,  he  says:  — 

Grant's  orders  were  for  me  to  destroy  the  Virginia  Central 
Railroad  and  the  James  River  Canal,  capture  Lynchburg  if  prac 
ticable,  and  then  join  General  Sherman  in  North  Carolina  wher 
ever  he  might  be  found,  or  return  to  Winchester,  but  as  to  join 
ing  Sherman  I  was  to  be  governed  by  the  state  of  affairs  after  the 
projected  capture  of  Lynchburg. 

Then,  on  page  119,  he  states :  — 

Being  thus  unable  to  cross  until  the  river  should  fall,  and 
knowing  that  it  was  impracticable  to  join  General  Sherman,  and 
useless  to  adhere  to  my  alternative  instructions  to  return  to  Win 
chester,  I  now  decided  to  destroy  still  more  thoroughly  the  James 
River  Canal  and  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad  and  then  join  Gen 
eral  Grant  in  front  of  Petersburg.  I  was  master  of  the  whole 
country  north  of  the  James  as  far  down  as  Goochland  ;  hence  the 
destruction  of  these  arteries  of  supply  could  be  easily  compassed, 
and  feeling  that  the  war  was  near  ing  its  end,  I  desired  my  cavalry 
to  be  in  at  the  death. 

On  page  124,  he  continues  :  — 

The  transfer  of  my  command  from  the  Shenandoah  Vallcv  to 


65 


the  field  of  operations  in  front  of  Petersburg  was  not  anticipated 
by  General  Grant,  indeed,  the  despateh  brought  from  Columbia 
by  my  scouts,  asking  that  supplies  be  sent  me  at,  the  White  House, 
was  the  first  word  that  reached  him  concerning'  the  move.  In 
view  of  my  message  the  general-in-chief  decided  to  wait  my  ar 
rival  before  beginning  spring  operations  with  the  investing  troops 
south  of  the  James  river,  for  he  felt  the  importance  of  having  my 
cavalry  at  hand  in  a  campaign  which  he  was  convinced  would 
wind  up  the  war.  We  remained  a  few  days  at  the  White  House 
.  .  .  .  When  all  was  ready  the  column  set  out  for  Hancock 
Station,  .  .  and  arriving  there  on  the  27th  of  March,  was  in 
orders  reunited  with  its  comrades  of  the  Second  Division 
The  reunited  corps  was  to  enter  upon  the  campaign  as  a  separate 
army,  I  reporting  directly  to  General  Grant;  the  intention  being 
thus  to  reward  me  for  foregoing,  of  my  own  choice,  my  position 
as  a  department  commander  by  joining  the  armies  at  Peters 
burg. 

On  page  127,  he  states  that  when  he  met  and  re 
ported  to  General  Grant  at  City  Point,  the  general- 
in-chief  closed  the  conversation  upon  the  Shenan- 
doah  Campaign  "with  the  remark  that  it  was  rare 
a  department  commander  voluntarily  deprived  him 
self  of  independence,  and  added  that  I  should  not 
suffer  for  it"  Continuing,  in  succeeding  pages,  he  re 
lates  that,  after  reading  a  general  letter  of  instruc 
tions  prepared  by  General  Grant  for  the  coming 
movement,  he  showed  plainly  that  he  was  dissatis 
fied  with  it,  and  immediately  began  to  offer  his 
objections  to  the  programme  in  a  somewhat  empha 
tic  manner,  and  that,  when  he  had  finished,  General 
Grant  quietly  told  him  that  the  portions  of  the  in 
structions  to  which  he  objected  were  only  "a  blind." 
On  pages  132-3,  relating  the  interview  between  Gen 
eral  Grant,  General  Sherman,  and  himself,  on  the 
night  of  March  27,  he  states  :  — 

.  .  .  I  made  no  comments  on  the  projects  for  moving  his 
own  (  General  Sherman's  )  troops,  but  as  soon  as  opportunity  of 
fered,  dissented  emphatically  from  the  proposition  to  have  me  join 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  repeating  in  substance  what  I  had 


previous!}'  expressed  to  General  Grant.  My  uneasiness  made  me 
somewhat  too  earnest,  I  fear,  but  General  Grant  soon  mollified 
me,  and  smoothed  matters  over  ...  so  I  pursued  the  subject 
no  farther. 

The  details  thus  given  by  General  Sheridan  are 
substantially  sustained  by  Generals  Grant  and  Ba- 
deau. 

It  remains,  therefore,  that  General  Grant  reward 
ed  the  insubordination  of  General  Sheridan  at  Spott- 
sylvania  Court  House  by  detaching  him  from  the 
command  of  General  Meade ;  that  he  again  rewarded 
him,  by  changing  for  his  benefit  the  Cavalry  Corps 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  into  the  independent 
command  entitled  uthe  army  of  the  Shenandoah," 
after  he  (General  Sheridan)  had  decided  for  himself 
that  it  was  useless  to  adhere  to  the  instructions  un 
der  which  he  had  been  operating  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  and  had  —  in  defiance  of  rules  and  articles  of 
war — withdrawn  his  command  from  the  depart 
ment  to  which  he  had  been  assigned  without  any 
more  urgent  necessity  than  that,  "  feeling  that  the 
war  was  nearing  its  end,  he  [I]  desired  his  [my] 
cavalry  to  be  in  at  the  death ;  "  and  that,  finally,  he 
"mollified"  the  same  officer's  emphatic  discontent 
and  objection  to  the  duties  to  which  his  command 
might  possibly  be  assigned,  by  concessions  in  his  fav 
or.  While  General  Sheridan  boasts,  and  General 
Grant  admits,  such  facts,  one  can  scarcely  credit 
\vith  much  of  dignity  the  efforts  of  the  last  Generals 
of  the  U.  S.  Army  to  justify  the  arbitrary  removal 
of  General  Warren  from  the  command  he  graced,  and 
from  participation  in  the  final  triumph  of  the  cause 
to  which  he  had  devoted  the  best  years  of  his  un 
selfish,  earnest  life. 

With  regard  to  the  sending  of  General  Miles  to 


07 


General  Sheridan  on  the  night  of  April  1—2,   General 
Grant  states  in  his  report :  — 

Some  apprehensions  filled  my  mind  lest  the  enemy  might  de 
sert  his  lines  during  the  night,  and  by  falling  upon  General  Sheri 
dan  before  assistance  could  reach  him,  drive  him  from  his  position 
and  open  the  way  for  retreat.  To  guard  against  this,  General 
Miles's  division  of  Humphreys's  corps  was  sent  to  reinforce  him, 
and  a  bombardment  was  commenced  and  kept  up  until  four 
o'clock  in  the  morning  (  April  2  ),  when  an  assault  was  ordered 
on  the  enemy's  lines. 

General  Humphreys's  report  states  that,  in  com 
pliance  with  orders  from  General  Grant,  at  5.30  p. 
m.,  April  1,  he  advanced  General  Miles's  division,  not 
only  toward,  but  across  the  White  Oak  Road,  and 
held  the  road  in  force,  and  that  (by  General  Grant's 
order),  soon  after  midnight,  finding  the  enemy's  lines 
in  his  front  too  strong  to  be  broken,  he  sent  General 
Miles  down  the  White  Oak  Road  to  reinforce  General 
Sheridan. 

After  the  close  of  the  engagement  at  Five  Forks, 
two  divisions  of  the  Fifth  Corps  were  posted  for  the 
night  across  the  White  Oak  Road  near  Gravelly  Run 
Church,  and  the  third  was  put  in  position  upon  the 
Ford  Road.  Mackenzie's  division  of  cavalry  was 
left  at  the  Ford  Road  crossing  of  Hatcher's  Run, 
and  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry  ( the  Army  of  the 
Shenandoah  )  was  held  at  and  near  Five  Forks. 

The  extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  intrenched 
lines  rested  upon  Hatcher's  Run,  in  timber,  and 
about  a  third  of  a  mile  west  of  the  Claiborne  Road. 
Thence  they  extended  to  the  left,  crossing  the  Clai 
borne  and  White  Oak  roads  just  east  of  the  forks, 
and  covering  the  latter  road  to  its  junction  with  the 
Boydton  Plank  road,  which  they  crossed,  and  again 
rested  upon  Hatcher's  Run  east  of  Burgess's  Mill. 
The  confronting  lines  of  the  Second  Corps  held  close 


68 


up  to  these  intrenchments.  After  the  defeat  of  the 
Confederate  forces  at  Five  Forks,  the  Cavalry  divi 
sions  of  Generals  Mtmford  and  the  Lees  united,  after 
crossing  Hatcher's  Run,  so  as  to  cover  the  Ford 
Road  crossing  of  that  stream.  They  were  joined 
during  the  night  by  four  brigades  of  infantry,  under 
General  R.  H.  Anderson,  sent  out  by  General  Lee,  by 
routes  north  of  Hatcher's  Run,  to  cover  the  collec 
tion  of  General  Pickett's  disorganized  troops  and  to 
take  up  a  position  at  Sutherland  Station.  They 
were  there  joined,  on  the  morning  of  April  2,  by  the 
remnants  of  General  Pickett's  command. 


In  view  of  the  fact  that,  on  April  7,  General 
Grant,  in  personal  command  at  Farmville,  with  at 
least  two  army  corps  present  and  ready  to  his  hand, 
permitted  the  Second  Corps  to  remain  isolated  at 
Cumberland  Church,  north  of  the  Appomattox  River, 
when  holding  at  bay  the  entire  remnant  of  the  Army 


69 


of  Northern  Virginia,  General  Grant's  solicitude  for 
General  Sheridan's  safety  at  Five  Forks  certainly  ap 
pears  to  have  been  excessive  and  unnecessary.  It 
was  manifest  from  the  situation  that  General  Lee 
was  imperatively  held  to  a  defensive  course.  With 
the  loss  of  the  engagement  at  Five  Forks,  and  the 
occupation  of  the  White  Oak  Road  by  the  left  of  the 
Second  Corps,  the  roads  south  of  the  Appomattox 
River  ceased  to  be  available,  as  lines  of  retreat,  for 
more  than  a  small  fraction  of  his  army ;  but  the  Dan 
ville  Railroad,  and  its  connections  with  Lynchburg, 
still  remained — provided  he  could  maintain  his  lines 
until  the  wagon-roads  were  passable.  There  is 
nothing  to  indicate  that,  under  the  circumstances, 
General  Lee  could  have  invited  inevitable,  and  irre 
trievable,  disaster  in  the  manner  apprehended  by 
General  Grant.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  how  the 
White  Oak  Road  could  have  been  opened  as  a  way 
for  retreat  except  by  the  defeat  of  the  Union  Army. 
That  General  Sheridan  at  Five  Forks  was  efficiently 
covered  upon  his  right  by  the  position  of  the  Second 
Corps  upon  and  along  the  White  Oak  Road,  is  clear 
ly  indicated  by  the  fact  that,  upon  General  Miles  re 
porting  to  General  Sheridan,  that  officer  immediately 
ordered  him  to  retrace  his  steps  to  the  position  he 
had  left. 

But  General  Sheridan  (Vol.  2,  pp.  172.  173) 
makes  another  point  prominent  and  explanatory, 
when  referring  to  General  Miles 's  movements  on 
April  2.  He  says  :  — 

The  night  of  the  1st  of  April,  General  Humphreys's  corps  — 
the  Second  —  had  extended  its  left  toward  the  White  Oak  Road, 
and  early  next  morning,  under  instructions  from  General  Grant, 
Miles 's  division  of  that  corps  reported  to  me,  and  supporting  him 
with  Ayres's  and  Crawford's  divisions  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  I  then 
directed  him  to  'advance  toward  Petersburg  and  attack  the  ene- 


70 


my's  works  at  the  intersection  of  the  Claiborne  and  White  Oak 
roads. 

Such  of  the  enemy  as  were  still  in  the  works  Miles  easily 
forced  across  Hatcher's  Run,  in  the  direction  of  Sutherland's  de 
pot,  but  the  Confederates  promptly  took  up  a  position  north  of 
the  little  stream,  and  Miles  being  anxious  to  attack,  I  gave  him 
leave,  but  just  at  this  time  General  Humphreys  came  up  with  a  re 
quest  to  me  from  General  Meade  to  return  Miles.  On  this  request 
I  relinquished  command  of  the  division,  -when,  supported  by  the 
Fifth  Corps  it  could  have  broken  In  the  enemy's  right  at  a  vital 
point;  and  I  have  always  since  regretted  that  I  did  so,  for  the 
message  Humphreys  conveyed  was  without  authority  from  Gen 
eral  Grant,  by  whom  Miles  had  been  sent  to  me,  but  thinking 
good  feeling  a  desideratum  just  then,  and  wishing  to  avoid  -wran 
gles,  I  faced  the  Fifth  Corps  about  and  marched  it  down  to  Five 
Forks,  and  out  the  Ford  Road  to  the  crossing  of  Hatcher's  Run. 
After  we  had  gone, ^General  Grant,  intending  this  quarter  of  the 
field  to  be  under  my  control,  ordered  Humphreys  -with  his  other 
two  divisions  to  move  to  the  right,  in  toward  Petersburg.  This 
left  Miles  entirely  unsupported,  and  his  gallant  attack  made  soon 
after  was  unsuccessful  at  first,  but  about  three  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon  he  carried  the  point  which  covered  the  retreat  from  Peters 
burg  and  Richmond. 

Before  the  Warren  Court  of  Inquiry  ( Record,  pp. 
127.  128 )  General  Sheridan  testifies  that  on  the 
morning  of  April  2,  he  advanced  with  General  Miles's 
division  supported  by  the  Fifth  Corps  and  drove 
the  enemy  out  of  the  intrenchments  at  the  forks  of 
the  Claiborne  and  White  Oak  roads;  that  he  cap 
tured  800  prisoners  at  the  crossing  of  Hatcher's 
Run ;  that  he  came  back  as  soon  as  he  found  they 
had  gone  from  there ;  that  he  didn't  care  about  them 
any  more;  that  he  saw  General  Humphreys,  and 
General  Humphreys's  command;  and  states:  "I 
told  him  it  was  not  any  use  for  me  to  go  up  there, 
and  I  went  back  so  as  to  get  to  the  railroad  as  quick 
as  I  could." 

In  the  official  report  of  Lieu  ten  ant-General 
Grant,  it  is  stated  that  on  the  morning  of  April  2, 
"General  Sheridan  being  advised  of  the  condition  of 


71 


affairs,  returned  General  Miles  to  his  proper  com 
mand."  This  corroborates  the  official  report  of  Gen 
eral  Humphreys,  which  states:  "At  9  a.  m.  I  received 
intelligence  from  General  Miles  that  he  was  on  his  re 
turn,  and  about  two  miles  from  the  position  he  had 
occupied  the  night  before  on  the  White  Oak  Road." 
This  is  also  sustained  by  the  despatch  from  General 
Meade  to  General  Sheridan,  which  that  officer  ap 
pears  to  think  he  received  at  the  hand  of  General 
Humphreys  although  the  terms  of  the  despatch  do 
not  support  the  supposition.  As  given  in  the  Appen 
dix  to  General  Sheridan's  report  of  May  16,  1865, 
that  despatch  is  as  follows  :  — 

Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

April  2,  1865  —  10a.m. 

General :  The  enemy  has  abandoned  his  line  in  front  of  Hum 
phreys,  and  is  falling  back  to  his  own  left,  and  said  to  be  forming 
a  little  beyond  Hatcher's  Run. 

Humphreys  is  coming  out  on  the  Boydton  plank,  and  Miles 
on  the  Claiborne  road.  General  Humphreys  has  assumed  com 
mand  of  Miles ;  the  5th  Corps  is  left  to  you.  General  Wright  is 
moving  down  (  south  )  the  Boydton  road,  with  General  Ord  cover 
ing  his  left.  We  presume  you  to  be  on  the  Cox  and  River  roads. 
If  General  Humphreys  hears  you  engaged  he  will  move  toward 
you.  If  you  hear  him  engaged  you  are  requested  to  move  toward 
him. 

Geo.  G.  Meade. 

Major-General  Commanding. 
Major-General  Sheridan 

General  Miles  testified  before  the  Warren  Court 
of  Inquiry  ( Record,  p.  646  )  that  he  reported  to  Gen 
eral  Sheridan  as  directed,  on  the  night  of  April  1, 
and  was  instructed  to  be  ready  early  in  the  morn 
ing,  and  that  he  reported  again,  about  5  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  and  received  orders  to  move  back  and 
attack  the  enemy's  line  where  it  crossed  the  White 
Oak  Road.  He  continues ; 

I  moved  back  up  this  road,  and  sent  word  to  General  Hum- 


72 


phrey's  notifying  him  of  my  approach  and  dispositions  to  attack 
that  line  at  the  junction  of  the  road  [White  Oak  and  Clai- 
borne  Roads]  .  Just  as  the  enemy  abandoned  it,  I  folio-wed  them 
over  to  Sutherland  Station,  and  had  a  very  successful  fight  with 
them  there. 

In  his  official  report  of  April  21,  1865,  General 
Humphreys,  after  stating  the  giving  way  of  the  ene 
my's  lines  in  his  front  at  8.30  a.  m.,  and  the  return 
of  General  Miles  as  above  quoted,  says :  — 

.  ,  .  I  directed  Mott  to  pursue  the  enemy  by  the  White 
Oak  and  Claiborne  roads,  leading  to  Sutherland's  Station  on  the 
Southside  Railroad,  Hays  to  follow  Mott,  .and  Miles  to  enter 
their  works  by  the  White  Oak  Road  and  take  the  Claiborne  Road. 
Prom  Miles's  position  on  the  White  Oak  Road  he  would  probably 
lead.  I  expected  by  this  movement  to  close  in  on  the  rear  of  that 
portion  of  the  enemy's  troops  cut  off  from  Petersburg,  while 
Sheridan  would  probably  strike  their  flank  and  front. 

Upon  the  arrival  of  the  Major-General  commanding  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  upon  the  ground  these  orders  were  changed. 
Mott  and  Hays  were  ordered  to  move  on  the  Boydton  Plank 
Road  toward  Petersburg,  and  connect  on  the  right  with  Wright's 
corps,  (the  Sixth),  and  Miles  was  instructed  to  move  toward 
Petersburg,  by  the  first  right-hand  fork  road  after  crossing  Hatch 
er's  Run,  and  connect  with  the  other  divisions. 

These  orders  having  been  given,  I  rode  over  to  Miles' s  divi 
sion,  which  I  overtook  on  the  Claiborne  Road  about  a  mile  be 
yond  Hatcher's  Run,  meeting  also  General  Sheridan  in  that  vicin 
ity.  Upon  hearing  from  the  latter  that  he  had  not  intended  to  re 
turn  General  Miles' s  division  to  my  command,!  declined  to  assume 
further  command  of  it,  and  left  it  to  carry  out  General  Sheridan's 
instructions,  whatever  they  might  be.  It  had  just  got  in  contact 
with  the  enemy's  rear. 

In  "The  Virginia  Campaign  of  '64  and  '65,"  Gen 
eral  Humphreys,  avoiding  even  the  appearance  of  re 
flecting  on  General  Sheridan,  sa}^  of  this : 

Finding  that  General  Miles  was  satisfied  that  he  could  defeat 
the  force  before  him,  General  Humphreys  left  him  to  accomplish  it 
and  rejoined  his  two  other  divisions,  .  ' 

It  is  evident  that  General  Humphreys  first  over 
took  General  Miles,  and  afterwards  met  General 
Sheridan  and  simply  declined  to  dispute  the  claim 


73 


made  by  the  latter  to  continued  control  of  General 
Miles's  division. 

The  diary  of  General  Fred.  T.  Locke,  Assistant 
Adjutant-General  Fifth  Army  Corps,  contains  the 
following  note  for  April  2,  1865  : 

Marched  at  6  a.  m.  toward  the  Claiborne  Road.  Received 
orders  to  cross  Hatcher's  Run  to  Cox  Station.  Arrived  at  South 
Side  R.  R.  at  2  p.  m. 

It  is  about  seven  miles  from  the  junction  of  the 
Claiborne  and  White  Oak  roads  to  the  South  Side 
Railroad  at  Cox  Station,  about  one  mile  from  the 
same  .junction  to  the  Claiborne  Road  crossing  of 
Hatcher's  Run,  and  over  two  miles  from  that  cross 
ing  to  Sutherland  Station.  The  report  of  General 
Charles  Griffin,  commanding  the  Fifth  Army  Corps, 
dated  April  29,  1865,  says  : 

On  the  morning  of  April  2d  the  command  moved  down  the 
White  Oak  Road  s,ome  two  miles,  and  massed  near  the  "Dabncy 
House,'1  v^here  it  remained  until  about  11  a.  m.,  when  it  returned 
to  the  "Five  Forks"  and  moved  across  Hatcher's  Run  on  the  Ford 
Road. 

The  Dabney  House  was  a  mile  west  of  the  junc 
tion  of  the  White  Oak  and  Claiborne  roads.  It  is 
manifest,  therefore,-  that  the  Fifth  Corps  was  not 
within  immediate  supporting  distance  of  General 
Miles's  attack  upon  Sutherland  Station,  when  the 
order  to  counter-march  upon  Cox  Station  was  re 
ceived.  On  slight  reflection,  it  is  also  manifest  that 
it  was  impossible  to  "break  in  the  enemy's  right  at  a 
vital  point"  by  an  attack  upon  the  force  at  bay  at 
Sutherland  Station,  for  that  force  was  simply  a  de 
tachment,  cut  off  and  separated  from  the  right  of  the 
Confederate  lines  by  a  distance  of  about  seven 
miles. 

The  writer  has  willingly  corrected  an  error  com 
mitted  by  him  in  a  previous  publication  when,  mis- 


74 


led  by  the  confiding  statements  of  General  Badeau's 
work,  he  defended  General  Sheridan  from  the  impu 
tation  of  having  left  General  Miles  unsupported  in 
his  gallant  encounter  with  the  enemy.  Otherwise, 
the  account  as  given  by  General  Sheridan  has  claim 
ed  extended  notice  only  as  another  illustration  of  the 
characteristics  of  his  Memoirs,  and  as  bearing  upon 
his  statement  that  General  Grant  ordered  General 
Humphreys  to  be  recalled  from  the  pursuit  of  the  ene 
my  in  his  front,  because  he  intended  that  quarter  of 
the  field  should  be  under  General  Sheridan's  control. 
General  Badeau,  also,  makes  this  last  point  promi 
nent  in  his  Military  History,  but  General  Grant 
more  prudently  refrains.  It  is  unnecessary  to  quote 
further  from  General  Sheridan's  words  to  illustrate 
or  emphasize  a  fact  concerning  the  recognition  of 
which  he  seems  to  have  been  needlessly  apprehensive. 
General  Grant  states  (Mem.  Vol.  2.  pp.  454-456) 
that,  with  General  Meade,  he  entered  Petersburg  on 
the  morning  of  April  3,  and  that  General  Meade,  in 
fluenced  by  an  improbable  report,  wished  to  cross 
the  Appomattox  river  at  that  point  in  pursuit  of 
the  Confederate  army.  He  says  :  — 

I  knew  that  Lee  was  no  fool,  as  he  would  have  been  to  have 
put  himself  and  his  army  between  two  formidable  streams  like  the 
James  and  Appomattox  rivers,  and  between  two  such  armies  as 

those  of  the  Potomac  and  the  James My  reply 

was  that  we  did  not  want  to  follow  him;  we  wanted  to  get 
ahead  of  him  and  cut  him  off,  and  if  he  would  only  stay  in  the  po 
sition  he  [Meade]  believed  him  to  be  in  at  that  time,  I  wanted 
nothing  better;  that  when  we  got  in  poscssion  of  the  Danville 
Railroad,  at  its  crossing  of  the  Appomattox  river,  if  we  still  found 
him  between  the  two  rivers,  all  we  had  to  do  was  to  move  east 
ward  and  close  him  up. 

Official  records  show  that  the  evacuation  of 
Petersburg  by  the  Confederate  army,  commenced  at 
8  p.  m.  of  April  2,  General  Longstreet's  command 


75 


leading  the  column  on  the  River  Road  north  of  the 
Appomattox  River,  which  they  recrossed  at  Goode's 
Bridge,  and  reached  Amelia  Court  House  some  time 
in  the  afternoon  of  April  4.  General  Gordon's  com 
mand  was  not  far  from  the  Court  House  by  night  of 
the  same  date,  and  General  Mahone  was  at  or  near 
Goode's  Bridge,  ten  or  twelve  miles  distant.  General 
E well's  command  did  not  reach  the  Court  House  till 
mid-day  of  April  5,  and  General  Anderson's  com 
mand,  which,  with  General  Fitz  Lee's  cavalry,  had 
fallen  back  by  the  roads  south  of  the  Appomattox 
River,  arrived  on  the  morning  of  that  day. 


Recalling  now,  in  connection  with  the  opinion  of 
General  Grant  just  quoted,  the  statement  of  General 
Sheridan  that  General  Miles,  at  Sutherland  Station, 
"  carried  the  point  which  covered  the  retreat  from 
Petersburg  and  Richmond,"  a  glance  at  any  map 
of  the  environs  of  Petersburg  will  indicate  that,  had 
General  Sheridan  been  with  his  command  upon  that 
line  of  retreat  on  the  morning  of  April  2,  as  General 
Meade's  despatch  of  10  a.  m.  of  that  date  states  it 
was  supposed  he  would  be,  and  had  General  Humph- 


76 


reys  been  allowed  to  continue  the  pursuit  of  the  ene 
my  retreating  before  the  Second  Corps  as  he  pro 
posed  and  had  commenced  to  do,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  but  that  the  whole  of  the  Confederate  force  at 
Sutherland  Station  would  have  been  destroyed  or 
captured,  and  the  way  to  the  upper  crossings  of  the 
Appomattox  River  have  been  left  undisputed  save 
by  possible  remnants  of  General  Fitz  Lee's  cavalry. 
It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  on  the  morning  of 
April  2,  General  Grant  had  at  least  a  very  favorable 
chance  to  confine  General  Lee  between  the  Appomat 
tox  and  James  rivers.  As  it  was,  with  General 
Sheridan  controlling'  that  portion  of  the  field,  the 
Fifth  Corps,  by  his  order,  wasted  the  morning  of 
April  2,  in  a  false  march  eastward  from  Five 
Forks,  and  the  evening  of  April  3,  found  the 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  the  Fifth  Army 
Corps,  confronted  by  the  Confederate  rear-guard 
at  Deep  Creek  -  but  little  more  than  twenty 
miles  west  of  Sutherland  Station.  Then  ensued 
movements  that  space  forbids  to  follow  in  detail 
here.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that,  —  the  concentration  of 
"the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah"  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  at  Jettersville ;  —  the  retarding  of  the  ar 
rival  of  the  infantry  at  that  point  until  the  after- 
noonfof  April  5,  by  the  erratic  movements  of  General 
Sheridan's  cavalry  upon  the  approaches  from  the 
east;  — the  fact  that  at  midnight  of  that  date  Gen 
eral  Sheridan  could  give  no  more  definite  account  of 
the  enemy  then  moving  in  full  force,  unretarded  and 
unobserved,  upon  the  unguarded  bridges  at  Farm- 
ville,  than  such  as  enabled  General  Grant  to  "have 
no  doubt  Lee  was  moving-  right  then"  ; — the  sac 
rifice  of  General  Read  and  Colonel  Washburn,  and 
their  gallant  little  command,  on  the  morning  of 


77 

April  6; — the  fact  that  the  retreating  Confederate 
army  was  first  discovered  at  9  a.  m.  of  April  6,  by 
the  cavalry  escort  attached  to  the  headquarters  of 
the  Second  Army  Corps; — the  disappearance  of  the 
despatches  of  the  commander  of  that  corps  giving 
information  of  the  unequalled  achievement  of  his 
troops  in  the  combat  which  immediatelv  followed, 
and  which  made  possible  General  Sheridan's  share  in 
the  victory  at  Sailor's  Creek; — the  ignoring  of  the 
isolated  position  of  the  Second  Corps  when  at  Cum 
berland  Church  on  the  afternoon  of  April  7,  it  held 
at  bay  north  of  the  Appomattox  River  all  that  re 
mained  organized  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia ; 
-  the  separation  of  General  Grant  from  General 
Meade,  and  from  direct  communication  with  Gener 
al  Lee,  on  the  early  morning  of  April  9  ; — these,  and 
many  other  details  of  that  movement  from  Peters 
burg  to  Appomattox  Court  House,  admit  of  but  one 
intelligible  explanation  —  that  claimed  by  Generals 
Badeau  and  Sheridan,  and  tacitly  admitted  by  Gen 
eral  Grant. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  has  never  asked  to 
share  the  reputation,  or  the  responsibility,  attach 
ing  to  the  peculiar  tactics  of  that  campaign ;  but  it 
will  be  an  ungrateful  country  indeed  that  fails  to 
recognize  and  award  that  army  —  tried  and  true  as 
few  armies  have  ever  been  —  the  respect  and  grati 
tude  due  to  the  heroic  loyalty  and  self-forgetfulness 
that  nerved  its  efforts,  and  in  every  trial  proved  it,  in 
the  words  of  its  noble  chief,  "regardless  of  any  other 
consideration  than  the  vital  one  of  destroying  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia." 


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